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MEDIATION WITH A MUGGER:
THE SHORTAGE OF ADJUDICATIVE SERVICES
AND THE NEED FOR A
TWO-TIER TRIAL SYSTEM IN CIVIL CASES
Albert W. Alschuler*
In the State of Nature there wants a known and indifferent Judge, with
Authority to determine all differences according to the established Law. For
every one in that state being both Judge and Executioner of the Law of
Nature, Men being partial to themselves, Passion and Revenge is very apt
to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own Cases.
John Locke'

I. INTRODUCTION: IMPARTIAL ADJUDICATION
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE

A. A Parable of the Subway

A about 2:30 p.m. on January 26, 198i, in a subway station in
I
anhattan, three youths attacked a man who was carrying electronics equipment worth between $8oo and $iooo. The victim attempted to escape by running up a stairway, but his attackers pursued
him. They caught their victim, beat him, and shoved him into a
plate glass window. Although the window did not break, a door
handle hit the man in the chest, tearing some tissue and cartilage and
causing considerable pain. The youths continued their beating until
a police officer arrived. Then two of them fled. The third failed to
notice the arrival of the officer and was apprehended while beating
the victim.
Although only sixteen, the arrested youth was wise in the ways of
the criminal justice system. He claimed that the man with the electronics equipment had attacked him and thereby provoked the incident. Because both the attacker and the victim had filed complaints,
the victim soon received written notice of an informal hearing at which
he could mediate his dispute with the mugger. The victim declined
the opportunity.
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

Harvard College, A.B., 1962; Harvard Law

School, LL.B., 1965. I am grateful to Gerhard Casper, Jeffrey Chasnow, Richard A. Epstein,
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The youth was ultimately punished for his crime. Although he
failed to appear in court on the return date specified in the summons,
it was not long before he was arrested for a similar crime in Brooklyn.
The two cases were consolidated, and after the defendant pleaded
guilty to reduced charges, he served six months in jail. He later
received a three-to-nine year penitentiary sentence for additional robberies committed after his release. At last word, he was still in prison.
The victim of the mugging, however, was never told what had
happened to his attacker. He thought that the case had ended when
he declined the offer of mediation. The victim decided that he needed
a gun, and his gun became famous. The victim's name was Bernhard
2
Goetz.
B. Subway Civics: Some Signals
for Criminal and Civil Justice
Goetz's use of his gun to wound four youths in a New York subway
just before Christmas 1984 received public acclaim that subsided only
when the full extent of his bloodlust became known. 3 Goetz's unwillingness to rely on a legal system that had invited mediation with
his attacker - as well as the public's initially favorable response to
Goetz's act of violence - suggests what can befall a society whose
legal system fails or is perceived to fail.
2 For fuller descriptions of these incidents, see McFadden, Goetz: A PrivateMan in a Public
Debate, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, x985, at Ai, col. i; Footnote to a Subway Shooting, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 14, i985, at AiS, col. i.
3 On December 22, 1984, four men approached Goetz while he was riding in a New York
subway. According to police reports, the four, aged 18 and i9, first asked Goetz for a match,
then for the time, and finally for five dollars. Although no currently available evidence suggests
that Goetz knew this fact, three of the men carried sharpened screwdrivers (devices that may
be used to break into video-game cash boxes more frequently than they are used as weapons).
All four had criminal records.
Goetz had a gun which he had acquired in Florida after the 1981 mugging, his application
for a firearms permit in New York having been rejected. Goetz opened fire, hitting all four
men. He then fled into the subway tunnel. A few weeks later, he surrendered to police and
was charged with attempted murder.
The shootings resulted in an initial groundswell of support for Goetz. As the New York
Times reported, "People seem less concerned with the exact events ... than with the concept
that someone somewhere had chosen to fight back." Fein, Angry Citizens in Many Cities
Supporting Goetz, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1985, at Bi, col. i. A grand jury indicted Goetz only
for a weapons violation.
One of the men was paralyzed by the shooting. Criticism of the grand jury escalated when
it was disclosed that Goetz had looked at one of the youths on the floor of the subway car,
said, "You don't look so bad, here's another," and then shot again. A new grand jury was
convened. In March z985, Goetz was indicted for attempted murder. In January 1986, however,
a trial judge concluded that the grand jury had been improperly instructed on the issue of selfdefense and dismissed the attempted-murder indictment. The case may be submitted to a grand
jury once again. See Step-by-Step: A Shooting, a Dismissal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1986, at
B 3 , col.I.
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Although Goetz's act suggests a lesson about retribution and criminal justice, 4 it also offers a broader lesson about procedure. Goetz's
despair and indignation may not have been entirely the product of his
sense that his attacker had gone unpunished. More fundamentally,
Goetz may have concluded that no one in the legal system had been
willing to listen and to determine whether this mugger deserved punishment. In place of a prompt hearing at which a judge or jury would
decide what had happened, this system had offered a conciliation
proceeding designed to encourage the victim and the victimizer to
resolve their differences and go on their way. The apparent procedural default of a bureaucratized and overburdened legal system may
have fueled Goetz's sense of injustice as much as his misperception of
the substantive outcome.
The eruption of Goetz's anger underscored a Lockean lesson. Adequate adjudicative services are central to the maintenance of a civilized society. This lesson is not confined to criminal proceedings. The
vindication of private rights, no less than punishment for wrongs
against society, is an essential part of the sensed social compact. By
assuring individuals that claims of injustice will be heard, considered,
and judged on their merits, the judicial branch of government performs a distinctive service. More than other governmental agencies,
courts reinforce a sense of individual worth and individual entitlement. The promise that every person's claims of injustice will be
taken seriously tends to lessen alienation and to foster an awareness
of community obligation. When it is alleged that one member of a
community has wronged another, someone must be available to hear
both sides and to provide an impartial, authoritative resolution of the
dispute.
Adjudication is not a service that America provides very well. My
earlier writings have focused on criminal cases, exploring the relationship between the complexity of America's trial procedures and its
lopsided dependency on the guilty plea.5 Adjudication has become
less accessible in civil cases as well. In response to growing caseloads
4 This act offers a reminder of a common social perception. When public retribution for
wrongdoing is withheld, self-help and private vengeance become more likely. In the days when
almost every justification for almost every policy was cast in terms of its pragmatic consequences,
this observation supplied a common argument for recognizing retribution as an appropriate

objective of the criminal law. See, e.g., R. CALDWELL, CRIMINOLOGY 390-93 (1956); P.
TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE, AND CORRECTION 242 (ig6o).
5 Perhaps our criminal trial procedures are inherently unworkable, or perhaps we have failed

to provide the resources needed to make them work. In either event, our legal system appears
to have tried every solution except the obvious ones - simplifying our trial procedures or else
providing the resources needed to make them available. We have embraced and extolled plea
bargaining, diversion, supervision, pretrial probation, accelerated rehabilitative disposition, and
mediation with muggers. See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea BargainingSystem, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983).
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and perceptions of administrative crisis, judges, lawyers, and legal
scholars have embraced a host of nonadjudicative shortcuts. They
have invented innumerable rationalizations for not doing the job and
innumerable ways to avoid it.
This Article focuses on the failure of adjudicative services in civil
cases. At the outset, it briefly considers the economics of litigation
and reexamines some fundamental, frequently forgotten reasons for
the provision and financing of these services by government. Then it
turns to the settlement of civil lawsuits, exploring some ways in which
the defects of America's legal system have distorted the settlement
process and noting some reforms that could make settlements more
just. It contends that deficiencies in judicial services have kept the
amount of adjudication below the level that might have been expected
in an era of vastly expanded rights.
The Article considers one prominent response to the shortcomings
of American procedure - today's closer judicial supervision of discovery and other pretrial activities. It suggests that "managerial judging," 6 although an important part of the solution, is also part of the
problem. As presently structured, judicial supervision has made pretrial proceedings more complex without adequately controlling pretrial
abuse. In addition, existing procedures do not sufficiently guard
against the threat to impartiality that may arise from judicial "case
management."
Finally, the Article reviews some practices in America and other
nations that mark an appropriate path toward reform. It proposes a
revised system of procedure that could cure or alleviate the defects
noted earlier. In this system, current "pretrial" activity would be
converted into a "first instance" trial that either party could treat as
advisory if he were willing to risk the costs of a "second instance"
proceeding.

II. THE PUBLIC FINANCING OF PRIVATE LITIGATION

For some economically minded legal scholars, impartial adjudication is just another service - like pressing clothes or hauling trash.
These scholars suggest that the rationing of adjudication by queue is
to be expected when the cost of obtaining this service is below its
market-clearing price, 7 and they consider whether it might be better
to provide this service through a private market or, if not, at least to
6 See Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 376 (1982).
7 See Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 74-77 (197);
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399, 445-47 (1973).
HeinOnline -- 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1811 1985-1986
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finance it primarily by collecting fees from people and organizations
that use it.8
Although litigation commonly proves expensive to the litigating
parties, these parties pay only a fraction of the cost of operating the
courts. In that sense, governments subsidize civil litigation, and the
subsidy is substantial. For example, during fiscal year 1982, the
estimated cost to the federal government of a tort suit filed in a United
States district court was $1740. In certain tort cases tried to juries,
the average cost was $15,028.9 Noting these expenses and, in addition, the fact that the federal government obtains only $60 per case
in filing fees, Richard Posner concluded, "[T]he subsidy is far too
great."' 0
Posner's recent study of The Federal Courts proposes "stiff user
fees" as a means of reducing federal caseloads." Although Judge
Posner stops short of urging that litigants bear all the expenses of
their lawsuits, he recognizes only one valid reason for public payment
of some of these expenses: "The fact that a lawsuit provides information that enables other disputants to settle their disputes without
litigation means that the parties to the suit are conferring benefits on
other people, and they ought to be able to shift some of the costs of
12
the litigation to those beneficiaries."'
Judge Posner argues in the same volume that tribunals that fail to
publish their decisions ordinarily do not provide much information of
benefit to the community. The essential function of these tribunals is
to resolve disputes about the past. 13 Posner's analysis offers little
reason for subsidizing litigation in these courts.
Even from an "efficiency" perspective, however, individuals should
not bear all the expense of vindicating their rights, not even through
14
proceedings that create only the most informal sorts of precedent.

8 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (x979).
9 J. KAALiK & A. ROBYN, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES
FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES xviii, xix (Rand Inst. for Civil Justice 1982).
10 R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 132 (i985).
11 Id. at 131-36. Increasing user fees in one set of courts for the purpose of channeling
disputes into another set of courts presents different issues from raising these fees in order to
discourage litigation in any court. Substantially increased filing fees in the federal courts might

not be objectionable if state-court filing fees remained low and if areas of exclusive federal
jurisdiction were exempt from filing-fee requirements. Judge Posner does not suggest either of
these qualifications, however; and although he discusses and defends the fact that his proposal
would route some cases from federal into state courts, he also discusses in general terms the
justification for subsidizing private litigation. Posner's position is apparently that the current
subsidy is excessive even apart from its "routing" effects. This Article accordingly treats the
proposal as raising the question whether our legal system should seek to reduce caseloads
generally through a cost-infliction strategy.
12 Id. at io; see id. at 131-32.
13 See id. at 3-4.
14To ensure an appropriate adversarial stake in litigation, it seems appropriate to require
litigants either to pay part of the costs of litigation or else to run a risk that they will pay part
HeinOnline -- 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1812 1985-1986
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Posner's analysis considers only the effects of subsidization within a
dispute-resolution system. It ignores effects that go beyond dispute
resolution to what might be called dispute prevention. Posner fails to
consider how a reduction in public funding for the courts ultimately
might affect conduct in marketplaces and on highways. Subsidized
private litigation can benefit the public, not only by creating benchmarks that promote the settlement of disputes, but also by persuading
potential wrongdoers that the violation of rights is likely to be un5

profitable. 1

This argument for subsidization probably seems clearest when the
cost to private parties of vindicating their rights exceeds the value of
these rights. When the cost of adjudication exceeds the amount at
stake, 16 people whose rights have been violated are likely to acquiesce
in the violation or "lump it." As potential wrongdoers gain confidence
that their potential victims will not seek legal redress, the economic
disincentive to the violation of rights fades and disappears. In a world
in which individuals seek only to maximize their wealth, any right
whose economic value is less than the cost of its vindication is in
jeopardy.

17

Of course, when the victim of a wrong fears its repetition, he may
rationally accept a short-term loss and pay what is necessary to correct
the wrong. This action may benefit the victim by persuading the
wrongdoer that he will not be allowed to profit from improper conduct
in the future. With sufficient assurance that the wrongdoer will desist
or turn to a new victim, however, the initial victim is likely to yield
rather than pursue this deterrent strategy.
Even when wrongdoers do not have continuing relationships with
their victims, they have a continuing relationship with society. The
subsidization of private litigation enables a society to pursue the same
deterrent strategy that an individual who feared further victimization
might pursue. This subsidization furthers a general perception that
wrongdoing will prove unprofitable. 18
of these costs if they lose. The argument that follows is not that litigation should be free or
that litigants should be relieved of the expenses that they currently bear. It is only that, in a
legal system that does not require losing litigants to bear their opponents' litigation expenses,
substantial subsidization of the costs of private litigation is appropriate.
15 Because the public has an interest in discouraging unfounded lawsuits just as it has an
interest in discouraging other harmful conduct, the argument for subsidization that follows
applies not only to plaintiffs who are forced to go to court to vindicate their rights but also to
defendants who must go to court to protect themselves against unjustified claims.
16 Situations in which even the successful pursuit of legal remedies will be unprofitable are
common in every society and especially common in a society like ours that has "professionalized"
litigation and made the process prolonged and complicated.
17 I do not contend that governments should subsidize litigation so much that people turn
routinely to the courts for the redress of every passing injury. "Lumping" trivial injuries and
resorting to lawful means of self-help are sometimes marks of appropriate self-reliance.
18 This perception promotes efficiency when rights themselves are defined in a way that
advances the efficient allocation of resources.
HeinOnline -- 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1813 1985-1986
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This economic argument for subsidization is not limited to cases
in which wronged parties are likely to "lump it" but rather extends to
every lawsuit. Although Judge Posner maintains that most common
law rules of liability are economically efficient, 19 his discussion of
judicial services neglects the fact that rules can be efficient only when
they are enforced. For example, Posner argues that use of the familiar
21
"Hand formula"20 in negligence cases promotes efficient behavior.
In our current legal system, however, the Hand formula is textbook
law rather than law in action, and a substantial increase in filing fees
would further diminish its ability to provide appropriate economic
incentives.
Confronted by lengthy delays and other impediments to legal redress, an injured plaintiff with a just and provable claim for $io,ooo
in damages may rationally settle for $5000 or some other fraction of
the amount that the Hand formula seems to promise him. Were our
legal system to increase the costs of justice in the manner that Judge
Posner suggests, the amount that the plaintiff would be likely to accept
in settlement would grow smaller. Wrongdoers would be required to
"internalize" a smaller portion of the cost that their conduct has inflicted on others. Their incentive to engage in improper or inefficient
22
conduct would increase.
In short, when justice is delayed, high-priced, or inaccessible, the
de facto rule of liability in negligence cases is not the Hand formula.
It is the amount that the Hand formula would award multiplied by
a fraction, and every increase in the cost of purchasing justice makes
the fraction smaller. At least in a legal system that does not shift the
winning party's legal expenses to the losing party, the public interest

19 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 25-192 (2d ed. 1977).
20 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.)

(imposing liability when the cost of avoiding injury would have been less than the cost of the
injury multiplied by its anticipated probability).
21 See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, i J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
22 Cf. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (I959) ("The obligation

to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct
and controlling policy.").
Litigation expenses that are borne equally by both parties may not alter the incentives that

substantive liability rules appear to provide. For example, just as the high cost to a plaintiff
of hiring a lawyer may make it rational for this plaintiff to accept in settlement a smaller
amount than the Hand formula seems to promise, the high cost to a defendant of hiring a
lawyer may make it rational for him to pay more. When opposing parties are equally wealthy
and when litigation costs are symmetrical, settlement is likely to approximate the result that
substantive liability rules would dictate. Nevertheless, in cases in which employees sue their
employers and in many other situations, opposing parties are not likely to be equally wealthy,
and some costs - for example, the burdens of delay (see infra pp. 1822-24) - are distributed
in an almost entirely one-sided fashion. Stiff filing fees of the sort proposed by Judge Posner
would be borne by federal court plaintiffs. These fees would, dollar-for-dollar, undercut the

Hand formula and other substantive rules of liability.
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in discouraging wrongful conduct justifies the subsidization of litigation. (Although the issue is more problematic, subsidization may be
23
efficient in a cost-shifting system as well).

Not all law-and-economics scholars have taken so narrow a view
of the adjudicative process as Judge Posner. Most notably, the work
of Steven Shavell has recognized that private litigation serves general
deterrent purposes.

24

Like Judge Posner and other economic analysts,

however, Professor Shavell appears to have overlooked another reason
for subsidization - the Lockean lesson of Goetz's gun. In the absence
of an effective peaceful means of vindicating private rights, people
retain a plausible claim that they are entitled to vindicate these rights
through self-help. A society that wishes its members to renounce this
claim must make a peaceful means of adjudicating disputes available
to them. 25 By assuming that the alternative to private adjudication
is simply the lack of this service ("lumping it" rather than justifiable
self-protection), economists have leaped over a critical stage of analysis. 26 Moreover, when the time necessary to obtain a trial is mea23 In theory, an unsubsidized, cost-shifting system requires a wrongdoer to bear all the costs
that his conduct has inflicted on others (both the costs inflicted on private individuals and those
imposed on the government). From a deterrent perspective, this unsubsidized, cost-shifting
system might seem obviously superior to either a non-cost-shifting or a subsidized system. Either
of these systems would relieve a wrongdoer of some of the costs of his wrongdoing. The
difficulty is that both cost shifting and the absence of public subsidization make litigation more
risky, not just for one party, but for both.
Typically, the outcome of a lawsuit cannot be foreseen, and an unsubsidized, cost-shifting
system requires each party to assume a substantial risk that he will bear all the expenses of a
suit. When people are risk-averse, they may be more reluctant to resort to adjudication in a
cost-shifting system than in one in which each party pays a share of the total costs. See Shavell,
Suit, Settlement, and Trial:A TheoreticalAnalysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation
of Legal Costs, xi J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 62 (1982). In both cost-shifting and non-cost-shifting
systems, wronged parties are unlikely to attach significant value to the general societal interest
in deterring future misconduct when they calculate the potential gains and potential losses of
pursuing their legal remedies. For this reason, litigation may fall below its "optimal" level in
either system unless it is substantially subsidized.
To put this possibly counterintuitive argument another way, a system in which adjudication
is viewed as "free" or "not too expensive" may be more effective in deterring misconduct than
a system in which wrongdoers face more severe sanctions but in which litigation is seen as so
risky that people hesitate to call wrongdoers to task.
In determining what contribution each of the three principal sources of litigation financing
the government, the prevailing party, and the losing party - should make, a variety of
combinations and principles seem plausible. Most of the economic literature has focused only
on how privately incurred costs should be allocated between the two litigants. The remainder
has considered how costs should be allocated between private litigants and the government. No
economic study of which I am aware has addressed the optimal contribution of all three sources.
24 See Shavell, The Social Versus The Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal
System, ix J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982).
2sThis argument for subsidization extends not only to the indigent but also to people for
whom vindicating their rights through self-help would be less costly than vindicating these rights
through the more peaceful methods that society has required.
26 Like subsidization, a cost-shifting, "loser pays" rule can ensure a peaceful means of
HeinOnline -- 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1815 1985-1986
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sured in years, the assertion of a moral right to self-help remains
plausible despite the subsidization of adjudication.
To assert that justice must be rationed by queue unless it is rationed by price is erroneous. Although the government has priced
emergency firefighting services substantially below cost, these services
have not been rationed by queue to any great extent. People might
be surprised to find this situation changed: "Thank you for calling
9II. If your house is still burning in April i987, a fire engine will
come." Apart from the fact that they gradually have gotten used to
it, Americans also might be shocked to discover that justice has been
rationed both by price and by queue to the extent that it often is
effectively unavailable.
In summary, the subsidization of private litigation can have at
least three valuable consequences. It can create precedents that aid
the settlement of disputes (an interest recognized by Judge Posner); it
can discourage wrongful primary conduct (an interest neglected by
Posner but recognized by Professor Shavell); and it can discourage
violent self-help (an interest neglected by Posner and Shavell but
recognized by John Locke). No list of consequences, however, can
capture fully the reasons for the public provision of adjudication. In
the end, some rights are sensed as rights, not merely as economically
efficient arrangements. That rights imply remedies is not a fresh or
transient idea. 27 When adjudication is unavailable, a lumberjack may
respond to an invasion of his rights with his fists. Nevertheless,
society's obligation to provide adjudication to an elderly invalid who
cannot fight is as strong as or stronger than its obligation to provide
adjudication to a lumberjack. The provision of adjudication is the
means by which society keeps the promises of its substantive law and
assures both lumberjacks and invalids that their rights are taken
seriously.
Impartial adjudication is one of the first tasks of government.
Indeed, a market that distributes other goods and services through
vindicating private rights and can make a wronged party's resort to the courts less expensive
than self-help. An adjudicative system without either cost shifting or subsidization, however,
could lead to frequent resort to extra-judicial remedies (as well as to frequent "lumping it" or
acquiescence in the violation of rights). It is probably no accident that English cost-shifting
rules emerged at a time when officials were selling judicial services at a profit. Without cost
shifting, the high price of English justice might have led wronged parties to bypass the courts
(just as it might have emboldened wrongdoers in their initial violation of rights). See infra note
96.
American colonists did not import the English system of exhorbitant fee exaction and
profiteering from the sale of justice. The lower price of American justice may have made
possible the development of the non-cost-shifting "American rule." See Leubsdorf, Toward a
History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1984, at 9, 12-13.

27See 3 IV. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23 ("Rlit is a general and indisputable rule, that
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy . . ").
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voluntary private contracts is premised on the availability of this
service. As this basic service has become less accessible, however,
observers have begun to alibi its absence. Like foxes who conclude
that unreachable grapes are probably sour, some advocates of "alternative dispute resolution" seem never to refer to adjudication without
adding a disparaging modifier like "full-blown." Nevertheless, adjudication is not a dirty word. It is a cornerstone of commerce, an
essential social service, and a hallmark of civilization.

III.

EXPLODING THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION

Scholars and judges commonly proclaim that America is experiencing a litigation explosion. 28 Indeed, Chief Justice Burger recently
claimed that "mass neurosis ... leads people to think courts were
created to solve all the problems of society." 29 The number of lawsuits
filed in American courts (especially the federal courts) has increased
dramatically, and burgeoning caseloads (measured in terms of the
number of lawsuits filed or terminated, not the number of trials) have
30
led to a widespread sense of crisis.
Nevertheless, in a nation in which trial and pretrial procedures
are unusually expensive, 3 1 in which litigation is unusually risky,3 2 in
which delays are long, 33 and in which the first goal of many judges
is to avoid judging, 3 4 Americans have not rushed to the courts in
unusual numbers. As Mark Galanter has demonstrated, civil lawsuits
are much less frequent in twentieth-century America than they have
been in many other societies (including colonial America where, in
some places, litigation rates appear to have been more than four times
ours). 3 5 Current litigation rates in the United States are only slightly
2$The development of today's "litigation explosion" literature is described in Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 5- 11 (1983).
29 N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at A21, col. I.
30 For an examination of the caseload crisis and its ill effect on the federal courts, see R.
POSNER, supra note Io. In state courts, civil filings apparently increased 14% during the three
years prior to 1981 but declined 4% in the three years after. See Elsasser, Furor Over Lawsuits
May Overstate Case, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 27, x986, § i, at 3, col. 5.
31 See infra pp. 1824-25, 1832-36.
32 See infra pp. 1825-28.
33 See infra pp. 1822-24.

34 See infra pp. 1828-30.
35 Galanter, supra note 28, at 40-41, 56-57. The litigation rates noted by Galanter are filing
rates, not trial rates. Because the proportion of cases resolved by trial has declined dramatically,
the disparity in trial rates undoubtedly would be substantially greater.
Galanter and his critics sometimes appear to have spoken at cross-purposes. The claim that
there is a "crisis in the courts" is not in tension with Galanter's demonstration that Americans
are not unusually litigious. Our cumbersome adjudicative machinery may be incapable of
meeting a demand for legal services that, judged from either a historical or a comparative
HeinOnline -- 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1817 1985-1986
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higher than those in England, France, and Denmark. They are somewhat lower than current rates in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 36 The crisis in our courts that observers decry may be the
product of an inadequate supply of adjudication rather than of the
excessive litigiousness of our society.
Although, when viewed from a long-term perspective, there may
have been no significant litigation explosion, there has been a law
explosion. Indeed, one suspects that some of those who have decried
the litigation explosion have simply misspoken. Their ill-articulated
complaint has not been about the volume of litigation but rather the
37
expanding reach of our substantive law.

The law explosion of recent decades seems unmistakable. In 1945,
the Illinois Revised Statutes were contained in a single volume. In
1955, there were two volumes; in 1965, three; in 1975, four; and in
1985, five. 38 Perhaps some of the new laws contained in these volumes have reduced the amount of litigation by simplifying earlier
complexities and by establishing new agencies to relieve the workload
of the courts. It seems a reasonable guess, however, that many more
39
of the new statutes have tended to increase the volume of litigation.
Certainly the growth of judge-made law would have been expected
to increase the flow of lawsuits. This law has greatly expanded the
scope of rights against the government and against the manufacturers
of injury-producing products. 40 Lawsuits are one obvious method of
vindicating new rights, yet the current "ratio" of adjudication to substantive rights appears low. In addition, an enormous growth in the
number of lawyers (from 286,000 in 1960 to 650,000 in 1985)41 might
perspective, is not exceptionally high. But cf. R. POSNER, supra note io, at 76-77 (criticizing
Galanter on the ground that his analysis "does not show the growth of the federal caseload
since i96o is not something to be concerned about").
36 See Galanter, supra note 28, at 52-54 table 3. Although American litigation rates are no
higher than those of some other countries, litigation is substantially more frequent in the United
States than in Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, and Japan. See id.; see also infra note 54 (discussing
reasons for the low litigation rate in Japan).
37 Unlike Galanter, who appears reassured by the lack of a more significant litigation explosion, I believe that a few litigation bursts might be in order. Our legal system should accommodate these bursts (and relieve its current crisis) by simplifying its principal form of trial and
making adjudication more accessible.
38 See ILL. REV. STAT. (I945); ILL. REV. STAT. (1955); ILL. REV. STAT. (1965); ILL. REV.

STAT. (1975); ILL. REV. STAT. (1985).
39Arthur R. Miller has noted a similar proliferation of federal legislation:
Throughout the ig6o's and 1970's Congress seemed to be operating a "new-right-ofthe-month club." . . . The same societal forces that fueled the civil rights movement...
impelled Congress to respond to other demands for justice, and new statutory rights of
action became available in the environmental, consumer, political rights, and safety fields.
Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. i, 5 (1984).
40 See W.

KEETON, D.

DOBBS, R.

KEETON & D.

OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE

LAW OF TORTS §§ 97-98, 131 (5th ed. 1984).
41 The figure for I96O appears in B. CURRAN, THE LAWYERS STATISTICAL REPORT 4 (Am.
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have been expected to increase the volume of litigation, and so might
the increased provision of legal services to the poor. 42 So, too, might
the legalization of advertising by lawyers, 43 the relaxation of various
rules against encouraging litigation, 44 the invalidation of minimumfee schedules, 4 5 the judicial implication of private causes of action
from regulatory provisions, 46 and the enactment of scores of statutes
that authorize the award of attorneys' fees to victorious plaintiffs
(frequently from government funds). 47 Why has a more dramatic
litigation explosion not materialized?
Professor Galanter's study supplies part of the answer. To some
extent, a reduction in the amount of contract and property litigation
has made room for title VII suits, product liability suits, medical
malpractice suits, and the like. 48 Perhaps the reduction of commercial
litigation has been partly the product of a diminution in commercial
disputes. The form contracts of large business entities may provide
for contingencies that the draftsmen of individually negotiated contracts overlooked. At the same time, the partial eclipse of contract
litigation also must reflect the growth of commercial arbitration. People who are able to escape our burdensome judicial procedures com4 9
monly do SO.
Moreover, as Professor Galanter recognizes, there has indeed been
a litigation explosion if one looks only to the most recent twenty-year
period and to filings rather than to trials.

Between 196o and

198o,

federal court filings per capita nearly doubled. 50 This increase, however, did not yield a remotely comparable increase in the number of
trials. Instead, during the same period, the percentage of federal cases
terminated during or after trial fell from 10.3 to 6.5. 5 1 "Similarly,"

Bar Found. 1985). The figure for x985 was reported by Barbara A. Curran, Project Director,
American Bar Foundation, in a telephone interview on April 8, 1986, and will be published in
a 1986 supplement to The Lawyers Statistical Report.
42 See Weinstein, The Poor's Right to Equal Access to the Courts, 13 CONN. L. REv. 65x,
659 (i98i).
43

See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).

44 See Miller, supra note 39, at 4-5.

See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
47 See Percival & Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest Litigation,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 233, 233.
48 See Galanter, supra note 28, at 42.
49 The parties to a commercial transaction are more able than other prospective litigants to
plan for arbitration. One cannot negotiate today with people who might run one down in an
automobile tomorrow, and once a dispute arises, the interests of one side or the other are likely
to make it too late to reach an agreement to arbitrate.
50 See Galanter, supra note 28, at 37. In absolute numbers, federal court filings have more
than tripled since 196o. See R. POSNER, supra note xo, at 63.
51 See Galanter, supra note 28, at 44 table 2. During the previous 2o-year period, the
percentage of civil cases terminated during or after trial had fallen from 15.2 to 10.3. See id.
45
46
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Professor Galanter notes, "from the early I96O's to 198o - a period
of increased filings . . . - the number of jury trials actually held fell
in both Cook County and San Francisco County."52 Professor Galanter notes similar findings in several other state court jurisdictions
and concludes: "The portion of cases that run the whole course has
declined. But for the minority of matters that run the full course,
adjudication is more protracted, more elaborate, more exhaustive, and
'53
more expensive.
The causal relationship between Galanter's second observation and
his first seems apparent. Our society has made adjudication more
expensive and less available. Recent years have seen both an expansion of law and a diminishing opportunity to invoke it. Perhaps, in
fact, overly elaborate procedures have saved us from overly expansive
law. At the same time, these procedures have limited our access to
54
justice.

IV.

THE FAILURE OF ADJUDICATION AND

ITS EFFECT ON CIVIL SETTLEMENT

Americans may not litigate enough, especially if litigating means
more than filing suit. Just as they bargain too much for guilty pleas,
they may settle too many civil cases. I do not contend that there is
any "correct" number of negotiated settlements, nor would I be distressed if amicable parties settled every potential lawsuit on terms
that they considered fair. Nevertheless, Americans currently settle
many of their disputes for the wrong reasons. Adjudication would
provide a fairer way of resolving some of these disputes.
52 Id. at 43-44 (citation omitted).
s3Id. at 44.

54Although Galanter seems to treat the lack of a genuine litigation explosion in America as
reassuring, his discussion of litigation in Japan recognizes that a lack of litigation may be a
legitimate cause for concern. Chief Justice Burger and others had portrayed Japan, in Galanter's
words, "as a peaceful garden ... uncorrupted by the worm of litigation." Galanter, supra note
28, at 57. Galanter suggests, however, that Japan's unusually low rate of litigation is the result
not of a lack of demand for litigation but of a restriction of supply.
In Japan, the number of lawyers eligible to appear in court has deliberately been kept low.
No more than about 500 law graduates can enter the private barristry, the corps of career
prosecutors, and the judicial corps in a single year. The number of judges has been kept low
as well. The number of judges per capita in 1969 was less than 40% of what it had been 79
years earlier. Finally, Japan imposes procedural hurdles to litigation, notably a requirement of
prior participation in conciliation proceedings. Id. at 57-59.
What is true of Japan also seems true of America, albeit on a less dramatic scale. Glanter's
study probably tells us less about the character of our allegedly contentious and litigious society
than it does about our government's failure to afford workable mechanisms for resolving our
disputes. We, too, have restricted our supply of adjudicative services. America, however, has
not done it by limiting its corps of lawyers.
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Although many people favor prohibiting plea bargaining in criminal cases (I among them),5 5 I know of no one who objects in principle
to the settlement of civil lawsuits. Despite the significant ways in
which private litigation benefits the public, the parties to civil litigation are not charged with the responsibility of allocating blame. For
the most part, these parties allocate instrumental goods (like money)
among themselves, and they may do so as they like. These parties
may impose liability where the law would deny it and deny it where
the law would impose it. 56 So long as civil settlement represents a
reasonably knowing, reasonably voluntary allocation of resources by
the parties most affected by this allocation, it is preferable to litiga5 7
tion.

To suppose that civil settlement is always admirable or at least
unobjectionable, however, is mistaken. At an operational level, the
settlement process can work unfairly in civil cases just as it can in
criminal cases. This Article will note five sources of unfairness that
currently infect the settlement of civil lawsuits.5 8 Together they reveal

ss See Alschuler, The Changing Plea BargainingDebate, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 652 (1981).
56 A procedure that declares a criminal defendant half-guilty seems inconsistent with our
traditional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 703-07. Nevertheless,
when the parties to a civil dispute choose to treat a defendant as half-liable (or doubly liable),
no third party has reason to complain. So long as this choice is made knowingly, the decision
to settle on the basis of extra-legal norms seems no more offensive than a decision by one party
to make a gift and by the other to accept it. For evidence that private concepts of justice
strongly influence the settlement process, see Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation:
Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637 (1976). In the absence of tangible
third-party effects or a demonstration that "public values" are preferable to the values of the
parties primarily affected by a settlement, protesting that private settlement may not permit the
articulation and development of public norms seems largely beside the point. But see Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
57 But see Fiss, supra note 56, at 1073-75. Although Professor Fiss claims that Americans
settle too many civil cases, his reservations about settlement have little in common with mine.
Fiss emphasizes that civil litigation sometimes involves more than an allocation of goods among
disputing parties. He describes private settlement as "the civil analogue of plea bargaining."
Id. at 1075. Certainly some civil actions - actions for treble damages, for example - do have
punitive objectives. Nevetheless, the existence of "mixed objective" proceedings should not blur
the different principles that ought to govern civil and criminal cases. These "mixed objective"
proceedings do not provide a sound reason for collapsing the civil and criminal models into one.
"What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it...
is the
judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition." Hart,
The Aims of Criminal Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1958, at 401, 404. So long as

a system of civil adjudication is fair, public objectives may be served by private litigation even
when the parties compromise. And even when public objectives are not fully served, to attempt
to force unwilling private parties to champion these interests is likely to prove ineffective.
Criminal cases differ from civil cases, not primarily because they involve public interests, but
because their principal object is to determine whether defendants merit punishment. "The ...
administration of a system of reward or penalty depends upon an objective determination of
whether the reward or penalty is deserved." Alschuler, supra note 55, at 705 (footnote omitted).
58 This list is not exhaustive. Another potential source of unfairness in civil settlement, for
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how the defects of America's adjudicative system have distorted the
settlement process. They are: first, the quantitative inadequacy of our
adjudicative services; second (a closely related phenomenon), the complexity of our trial and pretrial procedures; third, the substantive
uncertainty created by our inadequately law-bound system of jury
trials; fourth, the exertion of direct judicial pressure to settle; and
fifth, the ability of disputants to encourage settlement by driving up
their opponents' costs.
A. The Quantitative Inadequacy of Adjudicative Services
A clear manifestation of the current shortage of adjudicative services is the length of courthouse queues throughout America. Delays
of months and years before trial no longer seem astonishing. In the
Los Angeles Superior Court, the median time between the filing and
trial of a civil action was 4.5 months in i942. This period doubled
to 9 months in 1952, more than doubled to i9 months in 1962, grew9
5
to 30 months in 1972, and increased again to 41.5 months in

I982.

Although the delay encountered in large cities like Los Angeles 60 is
atypical, a waiting period of two and one-half years between the filing
of a lawsuit and its disposition by jury trial now appears routine even
in small city jurisdictions. 6 1
example - one that merits more empirical study than it has received sentation by lawyers.

is inadequate repre-

59 M. SELVIN & P. EBENER, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE: A HISTORY OF CIVIL DELAY

IN THE Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT 27 table 2.1 (Rand Inst. for Civil Justice 1984).
60 The clerk's office of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, estimates that a lawsuit
filed in that court today will come to trial in just under three years. Telephone interview (Apr.
24, 1985). As bad as things are in Chicago, they may be worse in New York. The New York
Times recently described a case in which a plaintiff alleged that she had been discharged from
her job in violation of a contract. Partly as a result of a system of frequent rotations in judicial
assignments, the case had come before io state-court judges over the course of four years. It
still had not reached trial. The Times said that it could have reported cases that had been
longer delayed and that had come before more judges; it sought, however, to describe a case
that had been "typical in its passage through the system." Roberts, Case 1439181: Days in Court
Without End, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1985, § IV, at 6, col. 2.
61 The National Center for State Courts recently reported the median time from the filing
of a civil lawsuit to the commencement of a jury trial in twelve jurisdictions. The jurisdictions
were not randomly chosen; some were selected because they had "undertaken ... significant
delay reduction effort[s] within the past 5-8 years." B. MAHONEY, L. SIPES & J. ITO, IMPLEMENTING DELAY REDUCTION AND DELAY PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS:

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM CURRENT RESEARCH (Nat'l Center for State Courts i985). The

"fastest" of the jurisdictions studied was Jersey City, New Jersey, where the median time between
the filing of a civil lawsuit and the commencement of a jury trial was about sixteen months.
The "slowest" of the jurisdictions was Providence, Rhode Island, where the median period of
pretrial delay was over four years. The median time for all twelve jurisdictions appeared to be
about two and one-half years. See id. at 8 table .I. In the federal courts, the median period
between the filing of a civil suit and its disposition by trial was 19 months in 1984. Because
this figure includes disposition by nonjury trials, it does not indicate the period that a federal
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The pervasive assumption that the settlement of disputes is desirable appears to have made some observers indifferent to the leverage
that produces settlement. Richard Posner, for example, once wrote:
To most experts in judicial administration, delay between the filing
and final disposition of a legal claim is an unmitigated evil and the
proper focus of judicial reform. This is an odd way to look at the
matter ....
Delay is [sometimes] a source of benefits .... It may increase
62
the settlement rate.
To the extent that delay produces settlements, however, it does so
unfairly. Increased pressure for settlement ought to be regarded as a
cost rather than a benefit of the queue. By enabling defendants to
postpone the day of reckoning, rationing by queue systematically disadvantages plaintiffs; preserving the status quo favors the defendant
in almost every lawsuit. 63 Indeed, for a plaintiff without capital
reserves or for an injured plaintiff whose medical bills are mounting,
the inability of our society to deliver adjudicative services within a
reasonable period of time may exert enormous pressure for compromise. 64 A partial corrective for this injustice lies in revision of the
common law rule that forbids the award of prejudgment interest on
nonliquidated damages. 65 When defendants do pay, they ought to
66
discover that delay has gained them only a temporary advantage.
court litigant was required to wait for a trial when his opponent wished to delay. See ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 290 table C6A.

62 Posner, supra note 7, at 445-46 (footnotes omitted). Of course Posner did not contend
that delay is an unmitigated good. His study listed a number of costs as well as a number of
benefits of delay.
63 Very occasionally delay may benefit a plaintiff - for example, in a toxic tort suit in which
the extent of the injury may not be known until some time after the suit has been filed.
64Queueing also creates pressure for "lumping it" and, in some cases, for self-help. A
mandatory delay of 50 years between filing and trial probably would not increase settlement
rates. Instead, it probably would reduce these rates substantially. From a purely economic
perspective, an infinite queue would leave a defendant with no reason to settle (apart, that is,
from the prospect that the plaintiff would throw a rock through his window or otherwise resort
to self-help). Similarly, it would leave a potential plaintiff with no reason to file.
Scholars have emphasized the influence of anticipated trial outcomes on civil settlements,
describing the settlement process as "bargaining in the shadow of the law." See, e.g., Mnookin
& Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
(0979). Frequently, however, Americans bargain in the shadow of unavailable law.
65 This rule has in fact been altered in various sorts of actions in a number of jurisdictions.
See Note, Interest in Judgments Against the Federal Government: The Need for Full Compensation, 91 YALE L.J. 297, 302 nn.29 & 32 (1981).

66 Posner recognized that "delay ... increases error costs by widening the gap between
damages and judgments that is created by the fact that... interest is usually allowed ... only
from the date of judgment." Posner, supra note 7, at 446. Oddly, although Posner objected to
the economic distortion worked by the denial of prejudgment interest, he listed the settlement
that this distortion encourages as one of the benefits of delay. See id. at 420-21. Of course
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In some jurisdictions, courthouse queues are no more lengthy today
than they were a generation ago. 67 Nevertheless, this circumstance
offers little reason to conclude that the underlying problem - the
inadequate supply of adjudication - has stabilized even in these
jurisdictions. William M. Landes noted in 1971 that queues are likely
to "reach an equilibrium size because ... trial demand is a decreasing
function of waiting or queueing time." 68 Despite vastly increased
judicial expenditures, 69 our multi-year queues remain, and increased
settlement rates70 may suggest that seemingly stable queues mask a
growing problem.
B. Procedural Complexity
One cause of today's queues is the complexity of American trial
procedures. 7 1 This complexity has been produced in part by the
controls believed necessary to make our jury system effective. In
earlier writings on criminal justice, I noted some familiar features of
the American jury trial, which, during this century, has become one
of the most cumbersome and expensive fact-finding mechanisms that
humankind has devised. These features include our prolonged, insulting, privacy-invading jury selection process; our wrangling over
evidentiary issues; our frequently repetitive (as well as pointless and
degrading) cross-examination by lawyers; and our formulation and
delivery of jury instructions that, all the empirical studies tell us,
jurors frequently fail to understand. 72 Of course America's complex
procedures not only contribute to the rationing of justice by queue;
they also increase more directly the dollar cost of obtaining justice,
notably by increasing the amount that litigants must spend on attorthe payment of prejudgment interest cannot fully remedy the injustice wrought by pretrial delay.
An award of interest is unlikely to be worth much to a plaintiff who has died prior to trial.
67 See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note io, at 95.
68 Landes, supra note 7, at 75.
69 See R. POSNER, supra note io, at 27 table 2.1 (in constant 1984 dollars, the federal court

budget increased from $5o million in i96o to $925 million in 1984); BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS -

1983, at 20

table 1.4 (1984) (state judicial budgets increased from $327 million in 1971 to $I.328 billion in
1979, a 306% increase).
70 See supra pp. i819-2o.

Our seemingly stable queues probably also have been purchased
by an increase in "lumping it." See supra pp. 1817-20.
71This Article will indicate the cumbersome character of American pretrial procedures in its
discussion of "managerial judging," a development that has corrected some pretrial abuses and
aggravated others. See infra pp. 1832-36.
72 See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 991-93, 999-1002, ioi6-22. I recognize that a simple
listing and characterization of these features of the American jury trial may be more provocative
than enlightening, but this Article is not the place to develop (or even repeat) my earlier critique
of American trial procedure. On the inability of jurors to understand jury instructions, see R.
HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 80, 231 (1983) and Alschuler, supra
note 5, at 991 n.286.
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neys' fees. In civil as in criminal cases, procedural safeguards backfire
when those whom the safeguards are intended to benefit find them
73
too burdensome to use.
Customary American trial procedures are plainly unworkable in
small-stakes cases - a fact recognized, albeit inadequately, 74 by the
creation of small-claims courts. In large-stakes cases, many litigants
probably can afford to pay for adjudication, but the product that they
buy is archaic. Juries, which under traditional (but fortunately crumbling) rules are forbidden to take notes, 75 resolve lengthy antitrust
cases in which the evidence is so extraordinarily complicated that
lawvyers on both sides must have computers at their counsel tables to
keep track of it. Indeed, if the truth be told, American trial procedures are not very serviceable for mid-stakes cases either.
The principal finding of the University of Wisconsin's Civil Litigation Research Project was that, despite our burdensome procedures,
litigation pays. In particular, plaintiffs in the cases studied by the
Project usually recovered more than they spent on costs and legal
fees. 76 Nevertheless, a similar finding probably would emerge from
the study of any legal system, however costly and defective the system
might be. People are unlikely to invoke legal procedures when these
procedures will not benefit them. When the most reassuring thing
that researchers can tell us about our adjudicative system is that it
does not fool most of the people most of the time, that system appears
to be in trouble.
C. Substantive Uncertainty
Although courthouse queues systematically benefit defendants, the
lawlessness of our jury system - especially the largely unguided
discretion that juries exercise in assessing damages - exerts pressure
for settlement on risk-averse litigants on both sides. This pressure is
likely to be intense for a seriously disabled plaintiff who fears a second
tragedy if he leaves the courthouse empty-handed; but, in the aggregate, the uncertainties of our jury system may exert more pressure on
defendants than on plaintiffs (even when the defendants are institutional litigants who, to some extent, can "spread the risk" over a
number of cases). Capricious jury awards are probably more likely
to benefit injured plaintiffs than to harm them, and there are only
73 See M. FEELEir, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979).

74 Legal fees of $ico per hour can quickly take the joy out of a $iooo, $2500 or $5000
lawsuit, yet the pro se branch of the small claims court in Cook County, Illinois, hears no case
in which more than $500 is at issue. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. xsoA, § 281 (Smith-Hurd 1985),
Historical and Practice Notes, at 611 (1985).
75 See Silas, Write It Down?: Jurors' Note-Taking Debated, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 35.
76 See Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31
UCLA L. REV. 72, 109-21 (1983).
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vague upper limits on punitive awards and awards for pain and
suffering.
The perils of uncertainty appear to have intensified in recent years.
Measured in constant dollars, most damage awards in San Francisco,
California, and Cook County, Illinois, were no greater in the late
1970S than they had been in the early I96os. Nevertheless, there was
77
a striking increase in the number and size of very large awards.
When litigation becomes a high-stakes lottery, many may seek to avoid
the risk of playing.
A partial remedy for this source of unfairness in the settlement
process seems apparent. About fifteen years ago, study commissions,
judges, academics, prosecutors, police officers, prisoners' unions, and
other reformers of widely disparate political viewpoints united to decry
lawlessness in criminal sentencing. The result was a sudden and
dramatic revolution in the sentencing process. The federal government and more than twenty states enacted major reforms; judges and
parole boards established sentencing guidelines; and sentencing com78
missions were created by the federal government and many states.
Lawless damage awards, the civil analogue of America's lawless criminal sentences of fifteen years ago, might be addressed in much the
same way - through the establishment of "damages commissions"
and "damages guidelines." Jurors could then receive at least as much
guidance in awarding damages as they currently receive in determin79
ing liability.
Greater certainty in the award of damages would have virtues
apart from its effect on settlement negotiations. Most of the vices of
excessive discretion identified in the judicial imposition of sentences
exist to some degree in the award of damages by juries (although
these vices have not been nearly so well documented). Some of these
vices may, in fact, be aggravated by the inability of jurors to view a
number of cases over time, to consult with others engaged in similar

77 M.

SHANLEY

&

M.

PETERSON, COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN SAN

FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959-1980, at Xii-Xiii, 26-30 (Rand Inst. for Civil Justice
1983). Although, measured in constant dollars, the amount of the average jury award nearly

tripled in San Francisco, almost all of this increase was attributable to increases in large awards
rather to any change in awards at, below, or slightly above the median. See id. at 26 table 9.
78 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18
§§ 3551-99 (1982 & Supp. IV 1984)); Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The Model
Sentencing and Corrections Act, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550, 1551 & n.5 (1981).
U.S.C.

79 In Anglo-Saxon England, a system of "bots" specified the compensation owed for various
injuries, see H. ADAMS, H. LODGE, E. YOUNG & J. LAUGHLIN, ESSAYS IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW

271-73, 278-79 (878), and workmen's compensation schemes provide schedules for financial
awards today, see 2 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 57.14, 58.11,
58.23 (1983). Damages guidelines might be administered in a more flexible manner than these
precursors; jurors could be instructed to depart from the guidelines if the guidelines did not
seem to fit the circumstances of specific cases.
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tasks, and to enagage in professional study of how best to perform
their duties.8 0
The dangers of excessive discretion include not simply capriciousness but also discrimination. After controlling for such variables as
the type of injury, the amount of lost income, the age and occupation
of the plaintiff, the type of lawsuit and the type of defendant, a recent
study of damage awards in Cook County reported that black plaintiffs
recovered significantly lower amounts than similarly situated white
plaintiffs. 8 1 The same study indicated that the perceived depth of a
defendant's pockets had an enormous impact on the jury's determination of damages. For example, after establishing a defendant's
negligent maintenance of a building or other property, a seriously
injured plaintiff would be likely to recover $37,000 from an individual,
$98,000 from a governmental agency, and $i6i,ooo from a corpora82

tion.

Not only could "damage commissions" begin to remedy these inequalities; they could also focus in a far more systematic fashion than
individual juries on the long-range effects of damage awards. They
could decide, for example, whether fair compensation requires the sort
of awards that have led doctors to abandon the specialties for which
they were trained, drug manufacturers to cease their production of
vaccines, and guest ranches to forbid their patrons from riding unescorted or at gaits faster than a walk. 83
80 At the same time, because groups tend to "regress toward the mean," greater uniformity
might be expected in decisions by twelve-person groups than in decisions by single individuals.
In England, where the civil jury has virtually disappeared, the judiciary has developed
reasonably precise standards for damage awards. See, e.g., Wright v. British Rys. Bd., [1983]
2 All E.R. 698 (H.L.); Gardner v. Gardner (C.A. Oct. 22, 1985) (available on LEXIS, Enggen
Library, Cases file); Sims v. William Howard & Son Ltd., [1964] 2 W.L.R. 794 (C.A.), noted
in 78 HARV. L. REv. 676 (1965).
81 For example, a case that led to a damage award of $34,500 for a black plainitiff would
be likely to yield an award of $46,600 for a white plaintiff. See A. CHIN & M. PETERSON,
DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS viii-ix, 37-41
(Rand Inst. for Civil Justice I985). The study includes in its analysis some cases in which
information concerning the amount of lost income was unavailable. Its authors recognize that
this omitted information might have explained part of the apparent racial disparity. See id. at
3982See id. at 43 table 4.5. On hearing these figures, my colleague Richard Epstein commented, "So much for the Hand formula!"
83 See M. BLOCK, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE AND OBSTETRICAL PRACTICE 5-7

(4985) (one fourth of surveyed members of the Michigan Section of the American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology reported that the cost of liability insurance had led them to stop
delivering babies altogether); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, DISION OF HEALTH PROMOTION AND
DISEASE PREVENTION, VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 118 (1985) (pharmaceutical companies have withdrawn from vaccine manufacturing and increasingly have cited litigation costs
and the difficulty of obtaining insurance as major factors in their decisions - their withdrawals
have "threaten[ed] the nation's supply of vaccine"); Middleton, The Medical Malpractice vars,
Nat'l L.J., Aug. 27, 1984, at I(cost of unnecessary tests and other "defensive medicine" estimated
at $5.1 billion by American Medical Association study).
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As this Article will explain in greater detail, 84 effective damages
guidelines, when coupled with other reforms, might make plaintiffs
and their attorneys less insistent on jury trials and more willing to
substitute other, less expensive forms of adjudication. Guidelines also
might facilitate appropriate private settlement. Today's uncertainty
in damage awards motivates risk-averse litigants to settle out of fear
that they may become the victims of caprice and unequal treatment
at trial. Certainty, however, could motivate settlement for a better
reason. Litigants who knew reasonably well how a trial would end
would have little reason to do battle. 85
D. Cajolery Conferences
Despite the roulette-wheel qualities of our damage awards, the
extraordinarily burdensome nature of our procedures, and the lengthy
wait necessary to secure a trial, some litigants persist in demanding
adjudication. When a litigant comes close to the end of the queue,
he is likely to encounter a vivid manifestation of our society's reluctance to provide adjudicative services. His case typically is scheduled
for something that procedural rules euphemistically call a pretrial
conference - commonly an off-the-record, in-chambers proceeding
that might better be characterized as an antitrial conference. Professor
Galanter has described how views of this conference have changed
since its introduction in the federal courts in 1938, documenting a
gradual glorification of the judge's role in inducing the parties to

14 See infra pp. 1853-54.
85 The assertion that both certainty and uncertainty can promote settlement may seem
contradictory, but it is not. Some settlements occur because people can predict trial outcomes
and see little reason to litigate. Others occur because people cannot predict trial outcomes and
seek to minimize the risks of defeat and of unfavorable damage awards.
This Article offers no assessment of the net quantitative effects of these differing motivations.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that when a new source of uncertainty appears in an adjudicative
system (when, for example, a visiting judge not known to the local bar is assigned to a local
court), the number of settlements is likely to increase. At the same time, a usual condition of
litigation is disagreement about the probable outcome of a lawsuit. Greater certainty tends to
reduce the likelihood of this disagreement.
Uncertainty can in fact be regarded as having two countervailing effects. When people are
risk averse, it provides a motive for settlement in itself. At the same time, it increases the
likelihood of disagreement concerning probable outcomes. This disagreement increases the
likelihood of litigation. (When uncertainty does not lead to divergent estimates of probable
outcomes - that is, when both parties assess the uncertainty in the same way - its principal
effect is less ambiguous; it encourages risk-averse litigants to settle.) Which of the countervailing
effects predominates (or whether the relationship is curvilinear with mid-level uncertainty leading
to the most litigation) is a matter of speculation. The argument in the text is simply that
settlements motivated by knowledge of the likely outcome are qualitatively different from those
motivated by the opposite phenomenon.
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settle.8 6 Indeed, the Federal Rules now list "facilitating
the settlement
87
of the case" as an explicit objective of the conference.
A national survey reports that only about one-fifth of America's
trial judges describe their typical posture as one of nonintervention in
settlement discussions. Most describe their role as to "intervene subtly
- through the use of cues/suggestions." One-tenth describe their
typical practice as
to "intervene aggressively - through the use of
88
direct pressure.
Professor Galanter quotes remarks made by Judge Frederick Lacy
to newly appointed federal judges - remarks that have been widely
distributed by the Federal Judicial Center:
[T]he judge should actively and firmly (but not coercively) seek to
settle every case on his docket. .

.

. I suggest that no more than five

per cent of each year's civil terminations should result from fully tried
cases. The other ninety-five percent, if not settled by counsel themselves, should be settled with the judge's active intervention.8 9

The federal courts achieved Judge Lacy's statistical goal in 1984;
the percentage of cases terminated during or after trial fell to five
percent.90 Moreover, the "active intervention" endorsed by Judge
Lacy is not confined to federal courts. In California, state courts
declare "trial holidays" during which judges devote their energies
entirely to the promotion of settlements. These "holidays" sometimes
last for weeks. 9 1 In Cook County, Illinois, every case in which a
plaintiff seeks $15,000 or more in damages is routed through the
Mediation Division of the Circuit Court. The seven judges of this
division conduct their business in "offices," not chambers. The walls
86 Galanter, ". . . A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge":JudicialMediation in the United
States, 12 J.L. & Soc'Y i (1985); see M. GALANTER, THE EMERGENCE OF THE JUDGE AS A
MEDIATOR IN CIVIL CASES (Working Paper 1984-5, Disputes Processing Research Program,
University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School, 1984); Oesterle, Trial Judges in Settlement Discussions: Mediators or Hagglers?, CORNELL L.F., June 1982, at 7.
87 FED. R. Civ. P. I6(a)(5); see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND § 23.11 (985)
("As the case progresses and both the judge and counsel learn more about it, the court should
urge the parties to consider - and reconsider - the possibility of settlement in the light of
what has occurred and, perhaps more important, what may be ahead if litigation is pursued.").
The authors of the original federal rules maintained that settlement discussions were not an
appropriate part of pretrial conferences. See Clark, Objectives of Pre-TialProcedure, 17 OHIO
ST. L.J. 163, 167 (1956).
88 J. RYAN, A. ASHMAN, B. SALES & S. SHANE-DUBOW, AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR
WORK STYLES AND PERFORMANCES 177 (1980). In a separate poll, 75% of the federal court
judges surveyed and 56% of the state court judges reported that they initiated settlement
discussions in jury cases. YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE, STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COURTS
83 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office for Improvements in the Adm'n of Justice 198o).
89 Galanter, supra note 86, at 4 (footnote omitted).
90 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 61, at 28o table C4.
91 See Menkel-Meadow, Judges and Settlement: What Part Should Judges Play?, TRIAL,
Oct. 1985, at 24, 28.
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are painted in pastel colors, and classical music plays in the background. The judges have had psychological training in mediation. 92
Whether the message is overt, veiled, or denied, uninvited judicial
participation in settlement discussions inevitably suggests that our
93
society affords adjudicative services only grudgingly.
E. The Strategic Infliction of Waste
A final source of unfairness in civil settlement is the power that
American procedure gives each party to drive up the other's unrecoverable costs. With sporadic exceptions, the extent to which, and the
ways in which, lawyers and litigants use their power to force expenditures by their opponents has not been the subject of systematic
empirical study. 94 Nevertheless, American procedure plainly invites
abuse; and the existence of an essentially unchecked power to abuse
is objectionable in principle however infrequently lawyers and litigants
take advantage of it.
An extreme example of unfair cost-infliction in settlement negotiations is the "strike suit" - the meritless lawsuit that gains settlement
value only because the defendant must expend resources to demonstrate its lack of merit. 95 Another example is the extensive invocation
of discovery procedures by a party who hopes that his opponent will
balk at the expense and settle on favorable terms. 96 Other examples
92 Remarks of James J. Alfini, American Bar Foundation Conference on the Judicial Role
in Settlement Activity, in Chicago (Nov. 7, 1985).
93In effect, when an American litigant seeks a principled resolution of his dispute, he often
is told what Bernhard Goetz was told: "Please, friend, let's be reasonable. Wouldn't you really
rather mediate?" Indeed, when the victim of an assault seeks damages from a mugger, a judge
in Chicago may invite the parties to negotiate to the strains of Debussy.
94So far as I am aware, the exceptions - important ones - are all studies of discovery
abuse. See, e.g., Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 198o AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 787 [hereinafter cited as Civil
Discovery: Lawyers' Views]; Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago
Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 198o AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.217; C.
ELLINGTON, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOvERY ABUSE (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fed.
Justice Research Program 1979).
95Richard Posner has argued that strike suits ought to be rare: "In the case of the truly
groundless claim the defendant knows that if he calls the plaintiff's bluff the plaintiff will not
throw away good money litigating the case, and the plaintiff should know that the defendant
knows this." Posner, supra note 7, at 433. This argument appears to assume substantial
symmetry in the ability to inflict litigation costs (including pretrial litigation costs), a condition
that is unlikely to exist in a large number of situations. Posner's argument also appears to
assume an equal ability to bear costs, a condition that may not exist in cases of wealth disparity.
See Rosenberg & Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
96 Between 80% and 92% of a sample of attorneys in large-stakes cases answered affirmatively when asked if "the purpose of imposing work burdens or economic pressure on another
party or attorney ever had been a factor in affecting their use of discovery tools." Civil
Discovery: Lawyer's Views, supra note 94, at 857 (the overall percentage of affirmative responses
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include the filing of burdensome pretrial motions partly because "[i]t
takes time to refute even a bad contention" 9 7 and the selection of a
forum for litigation that an opponent will find costly and inconvenient. 98 Adopting the British and Continental rule that a losing litigant
must pay the winner's litigation expenses, including attorney's fees,
would provide a substantial deterrent to the deliberate infliction of
costs as a negotiating strategy. Litigants would be less likely to drive
up their opponents' costs if they ran a significant risk of bearing these
costs themselves. 9 9 Whether our failure to adopt a cost-shifting rule
encourages or discourages litigation is problematic;10 0 but regardless
of how this empirical issue is resolved, a procedure that makes it
tactically advantageous to increase the costs that one's opponent must
incur in the effort to obtain justice seems unsound. 101
was not reported, but in every subgroup of the sample affirmative responses were between 8o%
and 92%). Antitrust lawyers admitted using this cost-infliction strategy in about one-third of
their cases over a five-year period. See id. at 857-58.
97 See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CH. L. REv. 5o, 56
(1968).
99 Cf. Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views, supra note 94, at 856 (describing the practice of
"noticing depositions for ... expensive to reach . . . places").
99 The academic literature has paid inadequate attention to this reason for cost shifting.
Indeed, some scholars have argued that cost shifting might increase litigation expenditures. See,
e.g., Goodhart, Current JudicialReform in England, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 395, 405-06 (1952);
Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. REv. 26,
36 (1969). The primary concern of these commentators has been that litigants might fail to hold
their own expenses down when they knew that these expenses might be borne by their opponents.
So long as litigants recognized a significant risk that they would bear litigation costs themselves,
however, the incentive to refrain from wasteful spending would remain strong. Indeed, utterly
wasteful spending would be unlikely even on the part of a litigant who was confident of victory
at trial. Not only would this wasteful spending fail to benefit the litigant, but it also would not
be compensable under any conceivable cost-shifting rule. The current American rule, by contrast, encourages litigants to inflict costs on their opponents when these costs yield no economic
return but merely provide settlement leverage.
100 See Shavell, sup-a note 23, at 58-69.
101 A patent lawyer in Chicago, most of whose clients are substantial business entities, told
me, "In many cases, settlement figures are determined by which side runs out of money first."
Interview with Ronald E. Larson, in Chicago (Aug. 28, 1985). Arthur R. Miller has observed,
"In many ways, contemporary federal litigation is analogous to the dance marathon contests of
yesteryear. The object ... is to ... drift ... to the litigation music for as long as possible,
hoping that everyone else will collapse from exhaustion." Miller, sup-a note 39, at 9.
The subject of cost shifting has generated an enormous amount of writing. This article does
not review the many arguments advanced on both sides of the issue. For a useful summary
and analysis, see Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982
DuKE L.J. 65x.
The cost-shifting issue may be simpler, however, than a river of consequentialist analysis
has made it seem. The same comparative judgment that requires a losing litigant to bear the
medical or other expenses at issue in a lawsuit also supports requiring this litigant to bear the
costs of legal proceedings. Although scholars have advanced strained distinctions between an
injured party's legal expenses and his medical expenses, no one has advanced a plausible basis
for judging a successful litigant a more appropriate source of litigation financing (in whole or
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V. THE PERILS AND PROMISES OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
The proposal for a revised system of civil procedure that this
Article will advance is designed not only to make adjudicative services
more available but also to satisfy two other requisites of American
civil procedure. One is the need to promote more effective "case
management" during the pretrial period (controlling discovery abuse,
discouraging procrastination by lawyers, and the like). The other is
the need to ensure judicial impartiality, a task made more difficult by
"case management."
"Managerial judging" has emerged in recent years as an ad hoc
response to some of the defects of American procedure noted in this
Article. To limit the strategic infliction of waste, to promote a more
rapid disposition of cases, and to reduce the high costs of justice,
American judges now supervise pretrial activities much more actively
than had been thought appropriate or necessary in earlier decades.
Opponents of this development have claimed that the virtues of pretrial case management remain to be proven1 0 2 while proponents have
discounted the threat to judicial disengagement and dispassion posed
by this activity. 10 3 In dismissing each other's contentions, both sides
have been wrong.
Defenders of "managerial judging" commonly assert that it makes
courts more productive. With respect to one managerial activity,
however -

judicial participation in settlement discussions -

this

in part) than his opponent. The balance of equities seems to favor cost-shifting even in close
cases, and the current American non-cost-shifting rule extends beyond these cases to others in
which the losing litigant's position has been far less strong than his opponent's.
Similarly, the fear that risk-averse disputants might be "too reluctant" to litigate in a costshifting system does not offer a principled justification for the current American rule. The
argument's "missing link" is a demonstration that the desirable airing of plausible but losing
contentions should be subsidized, not by the public or some other asserted beneficiary of this
activity, but by a group of people who already bear the activity's nonfinancial burdens, who do
not benefit from it, and who have been found to have done nothing wrong. When the perverse
economic incentives provided by our current rule are added to the equitable reasons for cost
shifting, the case for a general cost-shifting rule like those employed in every advanced legal
system except our own and Japan's seems compelling.
Perhaps it bears reiteration that cost-shifting is desirable only for those litigation expenses
that are appropriately borne by private litigants. For reasons that this Article has explained,
substantial governmental subsidization of private litigation is appropriate. See supra pp. i8i17.
It also merits mention that the baseline from which to measure "loss" for the purposes of
applying a "loser pays" rule need not be a litigant's position prior to the filing of a lawsuit.
Whether the litigant has improved his position by litigating rather than accepting his opponent's
most recent settlement offer is probably the appropriate inquiry. See infra p. 1852 & note 18o.
102 See Resnik, supra note 6, at 414-24.
13 See Flanders, Blind Umpires - A Response to ProfessorResnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 5o5
(1984); Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage
Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 253, 26o-67
(1985).
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claim may be unfounded. Most empirical studies have concluded that
judicial intervention neither increases the aggregate number of settlements nor reduces case processing time. 10 4 Nevertheless, judicial
monitoring of case preparation by lawyers - for example, the establishment and enforcement of discovery schedules - appears to speed
0 5
the disposition of cases substantially.
Even apart from its virtues in enhancing "productivity," judicial
supervision of evidence-gathering and other pretrial activities seems
104

See T. CHURCH, A. CARLSON, J. LEE & T. TAN, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF

LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 33 (1978); S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT
MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 37-39 (Federal Judicial Center, District
Court Study Series 1977); R. GILLESPIE, JUDICIAL PRODUCTIVITY AND COURT DELAY: AN
E.XPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS at xix, 46, 49 (977); M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE 28-29 (1964); H. ZEISEL, H.
KALVEN & B. BUCKHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT 141-54 (2d ed. 1978); Wall & Schiller, Judicial

Involvement in PretrialSettlement: A Judge is Not a Bump on a Log, Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC.,
Summer 1982, at 27, 37Unlike the works cited above, an unpublished study of pretrial conferences in Ontario,
Canada, reported a positive correlation between judicial settlement activity and the frequency
of settlement. See G. Watson, Judicial Mediation: The Results of a Controlled Experiment in
the Use of Settlement-Oriented Pretrial Conferences (1984) (unpublished manuscript) (describing
research conducted by M. Stevenson, G. Watson, and E. Weissman). The methodology of this
study was superior to those employed in earlier works, for only the Ontario study reported the
results of a fully controlled experiment. The study focused, however, on settlement conferences
in cases scheduled for trial before judges rather than juries. Although these cases would not
have been tried by the judges who conducted the settlement conferences, the ability of one
judge to predict the decisions of a second judge may be superior to a judge's ability to predict
the decisions of a jury. In addition, the positive correlation that the study reported was
attributable to the success of only a minority of the judges who conducted settlement conferences.
The ability of some judges in a nonjury system to induce settlements does not demonstrate that
judges in a jury system could be similarly successful.
The reported failure of judicial intervention to increase settlement rates in the United States
appears somewhat counterintuitive and is at odds with the impressions of most practicing
lawyers. A survey of i9OO attorneys who had recently litigated cases in United States district
courts reported, "A staggering 85 percent .. . agree that involvement by federal judges in
settlement discussions [is] likely to improve significantly the prospects for achiev:ng settlement."
IV. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS I (American Bar Ass'n Judicial Adm. Div. 1985); accord

Kritzer, The Judge's Role in Pretrial Case Processing: Assessing the Need for Change, 66
JUDICATURE 28, 36 (1982).

Marc Galanter has noted that today's American trial judges are less likely to have had long
careers as trial lawyers than their predecessors; they often may have had less experience in
assessing the "worth" of untried cases than the lawyers who appear before them. Remarks of
Marc Galanter, American Bar Foundation Conference on the Judicial Role in Settlement Activity, in Chicago (Nov. 7, 1985). At the same time, the assessment of a case by an objective
third party might be expected to have some effect in promoting settlement even when this third
party lacks extraordinary expertise. The danger that a refusal to settle might color a judge's
later rulings also might encourage settlement.
10sSee, e.g., S. FLANDERS, supra note 104, at 130 table 59; D. NEUBAUER, M. LIPETZ, M.
LUSKIN & J. RYAN, MANAGING THE PACE OF JUSTICE: AN EVALUATION OF LEAA's COURT

DELAY REDUCTION PROGRAMS (Nat'l Inst. of Justice 1981); Church, The "Old and the New"
Conventional Wisdom of Court Delay, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 395, 405 (1982).
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desirable. A judge cannot know whether a discovery request or a
request for a postponement is abusive or appropriate unless he is
familiar with the issues in the case and knows what evidence has
been gathered. If only because of its enhancement of the quality of
pretrial rulings, "managerial judging" seems likely to remain a long06
term feature of the American legal system .'
As originally enacted, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure envisioned a lawyer-controlled pretrial process that would operate effectively with only occasional judicial oversight. As Arthur R. Miller
has commented, however, the rules' premises now appear naive: "The
vision that adversarial tigers would behave like accommodating pussycats ...

has not materialized. ...

The truth is that we have a

pretrial system characterized by over-litigiousness, hyperactivity, and
marginal behavior by attorneys, producing excessive cost and de7
lay."1

0

Judges and rulemakers continue their efforts to tame the tigers and
recently have developed more sophisticated sanctions for lawyers who
have crossed an ill-defined line of abuse.' 0 8 Although the returns are
not in, and although the innovations are likely to prove beneficial in
many situations, the principal effect of these changes may be to generate more frequent satellite hearings and an ever more complex pretrial process.
In the end, short of resurrecting a regime in which each litigant
must produce his own evidence without significant help from his
opponent or the court, there may be no realistic alternative to a more
direct judicial involvement in evidence-gathering. A prominent recent
effort illustrates the hopelessness of mechanisms for limiting pretrial
abuse without this involvement. Some jurisdictions have adopted
local rules of court that, without regard to the nature of the case, fix
the number of interrogatories that litigants may submit to their opponents.10 9 These rules invite frequent requests for dispensation, are
likely to operate unfairly when judges hesitate to grant these requests,
encourage artful draftsmanship by lawyers who strive to compress
many queries into one, and generate linguistic disputation as opposing
106 Indeed,

a return to the premanagerial era seems nearly inconceivable, especially in

complex cases. Cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND §

20.1 (1985) ("Lawyers and
judges are virtually unanimous . . . on the critical need for early active involvement by the
judiciary in managing complex litigation.").
107 Miller, supra note 39, at I5 (footnotes omitted).

108 See, e.g., FED. R. CIr. P. ii, 26(g), 16(f) (1983 amendments); Miller, supra note 39, at
24-29 (commenting favorably on this development).
109 See, e.g., D. ALASKA R. 8(C); C.D. CAL. R. 8.2.1; D. NEB. R. 9(C); W.D. OKLA. R.

io(A); see also A.B.A. SECTION OF LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR
THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE i8, 20 (1977); JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES,
COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 77 F.R.D. 613, 645-49 (1978).
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lawyers protest this stratagem. Rather than prod advocates to do
justice, perhaps courts ought to do justice themselves.1 10 Greater
judicial involvement in evidence-gathering would obviate the need for
artificial rules and satellite hearings. When judged by the norms of
other complex activities, litigation in America appears undermanaged
rather than overmanaged. Our system of justice could profit from
more "managerial judging" rather than less.
As a path-breaking study by Judith Resnik has contended,1 1 ' however, active pretrial case management involves a significant departure
from traditional concepts of the appropriate judicial role and may
threaten judicial impartiality. The danger is not simply that managerial judges may develop what Professor Miller has called "a mystique of disposition uber alles"" 2 (although an emphasis on disposition
for its own sake has become a striking and distressing characteristic
of the American judiciary)." 3 More fundamentally, a judge who has
gained familiarity with the facts of a case during his pretrial activities
is unlikely to relish the prospect of hearing the evidence again at trial.
This judge may regard an elaborate adversarial proceeding as unnecessary (as indeed it often is) and may attempt to "cut through the
foliage" in order to save the taxpayers, the litigants and - of course
himself the bother of a costly and largely duplicative proceeding.
The emergence of a far more aggressive judicial participation in settlement discussions at the same time that other forms of case management have exposed judges to piecemeal previews of possible trials
is probably no coincidence. 114
Without affording the parties a full opportunity to be heard, a
"managerial" judge may, in effect, decide a case and encourage settlement on terms that correspond to his barely provisional views. When
the "pretrial" judge is also the judge who will conduct a trial if
settlement is declined, his "advice" may carry more weight than
friendly advice should. Whether or not the judge intends to convey
this message, his prodding may suggest that he much prefers the role
of a "settlement judge" to that of a "trial judge"; 15 it also raises the
110 Cf. Alschuler, The Preservationof a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or a
Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. CoLo. L. REV. 349, 354 (ig8i) ("Lawyers simply are not
appropriate figures to correct the defects of our adversary system. Their hearts will never be
in it, and . . . it is unfair to both their clients and themselves to require them to serve two
masters.").
"I See Resnik, supra note 6.
112 Miller, supra note 39, at 35.
113 See, e.g., Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining (Part 1), 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 1059, 1099-1102 (976) (describing the courthouse game of "disposition rate rivalry" and
the penalties that losing judges may incur).
114 In its indignant insistence that pretrial case management is unrelated to judicial intervention in settlement discussions, Steven Flanders' critique of Resnik's article apparently misses
the article's central point. See generally Flanders, supra note 103.
11sSee Galanter, supra note 86, at i.
HeinOnline -- 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1835 1985-1986

1836

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:18o8

possibility that an "unreasonable" refusal to settle may color his rulings
at trial. To be sure, disputants often may value mediation by an
impartial third party. This mediation may facilitate settlement in
ways that both of them desire and may improve the quality of any
agreement that they reach. The dangers of hasty judgment, of failure
to afford an adequate opportunity to be heard, of partiality at trial,
and of undue pressure to settle do not always accompany managerial
judging. Nevertheless, these dangers require much more effective
correctives than our legal system currently provides.

VI. TOWARD

A SOLUTION

This Article has noted a number of reforms that would promote
greater fairness in the settlement of civil lawsuits - adopting a costshifting, "loser pays" rule that would limit the ability of litigants to
16
encourage settlement by driving up their opponents' expenses,'
awarding prejudgment interest on nonliquidated damages and thereby
limiting the extent to which delay serves as a one-sided lever benefiting
defendants, 117 and developing "damages guidelines" that would reduce
the fear of jury capriciousness, a fear that currently encourages all
but the boldest of litigants to settle. 118
Although each of these reforms would contribute to the quality of
negotiated settlements, none would address directly the principal
source of unfairness in civil settlement, the shortage of adjudicative
services. Certainly the most effective way to remedy this shortage
would not be to pour additional resources into our existing adjudicative machinery - something that Americans have done in recent years
without much effect. 1 19 In discussing the shortage of adjudicative
services in criminal cases, I wrote, "The key to eliminating America's
widespread subversion of the right to trial may lie in making trial a
more workable, more affordable procedure. "120 This objective could
21
be accomplished more easily in civil than in criminal cases.1
116 See supra pp. i83o-31 & note ioi.
117 See supra p. 1823.
118 See supra pp. 1825-28.
119 See R. POSNER, supra note io, at 27 table 2.i; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 69, at 20 table 1.4.

120 Alschuler, supra note 5, at 970.
121 The federal Constitution, as interpreted since the due process revolution, mandates much
of the current complexity of American criminal procedure, and the public objectives of criminal
proceedings (as well as the indigency of most defendants) make any significant financing of
criminal trials through user fees inappropriate. Accordingly, the most promising path toward
reform of our nonadjudicative criminal process probably lies in substituting a less restrictive
form of bargaining for plea bargaining - bargaining for waiver of the right to jury trial but
not for waiver of the right to trial before a court. In Philadelphia, America's fifth largest city,
nonjury trials have in fact become the most common method of resolving criminal cases; the
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More detailed development of this proposal must await a description of some worthwhile institutions in America, England, and Continental Europe that mark an appropriate path toward reform. In
essence, however, the proposal calls for a more active judicial participation in what now are regarded as pretrial activities - the disclosure
of each party's evidence to the other and the gathering of evidence
from third parties. This judicial participation, coupled with other
innovations, would permit the conversion of these "pretrial" activities
into something more - an impartial adjudication that the parties
often might regard as sufficient to resolve their dispute. Once all the
evidence had been gathered, the judge who had supervised its gathering could resolve each case on its merits. Either party would be
free to treat this resolution as advisory and to seek a formal, adversarial trial before a different judge or a jury. Nevertheless, a litigant
would be required to bear the costs of this second proceeding including both the full costs of the proceeding to the government and
the litigation expenses reasonably incurred by his opponent - if the
outcome of the proceeding proved no more favorable to him than the
outcome of the initial procedure.
A. Promising Progenitorsof Reform
This Article has suggested that our system of civil procedure requires three relatively far-reaching reforms: first and foremost, the
provision of a simplified form of adjudication that would make justice
more accessible; second, a closer judicial control of evidence-gathering;
and third, an effective remedy for the loss of impartiality that sometimes accompanies "managerial judging." A number of institutions
and practices -

both in our own legal system and in others

-

point

the way toward the realization of these objectives.
i. The PretrialDuties of American Magistrates and English Masters. - One relevant practice is the use of magistrates in United
States district courts to supervise discovery and to conduct pretrial
principal reason has been that convictions at these trials do not ordinarily lead to more severe
sentences than would have followed bargained pleas of guilty. See id. at 1024-43; Schulhofer,
Is Plea BargainingInevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1057-62 (1984).
Although Philadelphia affords criminal defendants an unfettered right to adjudication and
thereby avoids many of the defects of plea bargaining, that city's "waiver bargaining" appears
virtuous only in comparison to practices elsewhere. Philadelphia, like most other American
jurisdictions, discourages jury trials through the threat of more severe sentences than would
follow convictions at nonjury trials. It thereby penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right
and bases criminal punishment partly on defendants' strategies rather than on their crimes. In
civil cases, by contrast, America can escape adjudicative procedures that promise too much and
deliver too little without dealing in the currency of human liberty. It can provide a substantially
simplified form of adjudication to all litigants and can, at the same time, retain more elaborate
procedures for litigants willing to run the risk of paying the economic cost of these procedures
if they lose.
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conferences - a practice that is frequent but unregularized, varying
from judge to judge and from court to court.122 Another is the use
of masters in England to conduct all pretrial proceedings, a practice
that ensures a much more systematic separation of pretrial and trial
functions than do American practices. English masters supervise
pleading, discovery, issue identification, and scheduling and also make
some case-dispositive rulings (for example, dismissing cases in which
plaintiffs have failed to state valid claims).1 23 Although the masters'
rulings are subject to interlocutory and ordinarily de novo review,
appeals are infrequent, largely because reversal rates are low and
because courts impose costs, including attorneys' fees, on parties who
lose on appeal.1 24 Linda J. Silberman, the author of a careful and
detailed study of English masters, has noted that the English system
requires the final resolution of all procedural issues prior to the commencement of trial.' 2 5 Seven years before Resnik focused attention
on the problems of managerial judging, Silberman commented:
The English ....
see an advantage in insulating their judges from
the parties' contests over interlocutory or other collateral matters:
keeping pretrial proceedings away from the presiding trial judge prevents matters arising at a preliminary stage from influencing or prejudicing the judge when he presides in the context of a full trial. 126
An English-style separation of the trial and pretrial functions could
facilitate closer judicial supervision of pretrial activities and, at the
same time, provide a more effective corrective for the partiality that
may arise from this supervision. Rather than seek an accomodation
of conflicting values, our legal system could pursue both values more
effectively. A clearer division of labor would also eliminate the danger
that a "pretrial" judge might deliberately or inadvertently coerce settlement through an explicit, implicit, or even misperceived threat of

122 See C. SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 44 table 9

(1983); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue, 5o N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1297,

1300-04, 1338-41 (x975).

In noting some virtues of the use of magistrates to

supervise pretrial proceedings, I refer only to the benefits of assigning special pretrial responsibilities to a distinct set of judicial officers. I do not consider whether this use of magistrates
delegates excessive authority to people who lack the guarantees of impartiality that article III
mandates for federal judges. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, 742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7 th
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting). See generally Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III
Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 58i (1985) (exploring the labyrinth of the Supreme Court's article
III decisions).
123 See Silberman, Masters and MagistratesPart I: The English Model, 5o N.Y.U. L. REv.
1070, 1079-1105 (1975).
124 See id. at io86.
125 See id. at 1116-17.
126 Id. at iio6-07 (footnote omitted).
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retaliation at trial. 127 Nevertheless, this separation of functions would
not make adjudicative services more available.
The "court-annexed arbitra2. "Court-Annexed Arbitration." tion" programs of a number of American jurisdictions do make adjudication more accessible. 128 To date, these programs have been
limited to cases in which the stakes are relatively small. 129 Their
common attribute is simply the referral of eligible cases to mandatory
pretrial arbitration. The arbitration, typically conducted by a practicing lawyer, a retired judge, or a panel of three lawyers, consists of
a quasi-judicial hearing and a resolution of the dispute. Either party
may reject the arbitrator's decision and insist on a trial before a judge
or a jury.
In some programs, rejection of the arbitrator's award risks no
sanction; in others, a party who falls to improve his position at trial
(that is, a plaintiff who recovers less than the arbitrator has awarded
or a defendant who is required to pay more) is ordered to pay arbitration costs or court costs (and, in a very few programs, attorneys'
fees that the opposing party has incurred).130 To some extent, courtannexed arbitration resembles the'older and better established practice
of trying small-stakes cases initially in courts not of record and then
permitting trials de novo in courts of general jurisdiction. 13 It also
resembles the practice of requiring litigants in medical malpractice
127 English masters do not appear to participate in settlement discussions. See id. at xii
& n.270.

128As of January 1985, 16 states and xx federal district courts had authorized court-annexed
arbitration programs. See P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION:
THE NATIONAL PICTURE 2 (Rand Inst. for Civil Justice 1985). See generally D. HENSLER,
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE STATE TRIAL COURT SYSTEM 12 (I984); E. LIND & J.
SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS (1983); Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 6 U. McH. J.L. REF. 537 (1983); Nejelski

& Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts: The PhiladelphiaStory, 42 MD.
L. REV. 787 (1983); Court-OrderedArbitration:A Report on the First National Conference on
Court-OrderedArbitration, DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM, Aug. 1985, at I [hereinafter cited as

National Conference Report]; Note, Compulsory JudicialArbitration in California:Reducing the
Delay and Expense of Resolving Uncomplicated Civil Disputes, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 475 (1978).
One reason that "court-annexed arbitration" has not attracted the attention it deserves may
be that someone gave the practice a foolish name (how does one annex a court to an arbitration?)

and then slipped the name amidst a long list of appalling, nonadjudicative "alternative dispute
resolution" techniques. One typically hears about court-annexed arbitration just after a judge
has given an enthusiastic description of his court's "Getting-to-Yes-With-Your-Mugger Program."
129 The maximum amount at issue is as high as $i5o,ooo in some federal programs but is
typically $5o,ooo, $25,000, $15,000, $o,ooo or even less in state programs. See P. EBENER &
D. BETANCOURT, supra note 128, at 9-IO table 3; see also E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note
128, at 3-4; CAL. CxV. PROC. CODE § 1141.12 (West 1982). Even in California (where the

maximum amount at issue is $r5,ooo in most counties and $25,000 in others) and in Pittsburgh
(where the maximum amount at issue is $2o,ooo), about 60% of all civil damage actions are
referred to arbitration. See D. HENSLER, supra note 128, at 7, 12.
130 See P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 128, at 9-IO table 3.
131 See, e.g., VA. CODE § 16-io6 (1982).
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disputes to submit their evidence initially to a panel of arbitrators and
to risk cost-shifting sanctions if they proceed to trial without improving their positions. 132
Relatively few of the cases submitted to mandatory arbitration
proceed to trial later - fewer, apparently, than would have proceeded
to trial in the absence of arbitration. 133 Even litigants who do initially
seek trial following arbitration commonly settle, and lawyers report
that the arbitrators' resolution of disputed issues has aided the settlement process. 1 34 Surveys of both lawyers and litigants whose cases
have been submitted to arbitration reveal a high level of satisfaction, 135 and courts with mandatory arbitration programs have experienced significant reductions in backlogs and case processing time. 13 6
3. Continental Civil Procedure. - In a powerful and provocative
study, John H. Langbein has urged the civil procedure of the Federal
Republic of Germany as a model for reform.1 3 7 He has observed:

132 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. iio, §§ 2-1012-1020 (I985) (requiring initial submission
of a malpractice claim to a panel composed of a circuit judge, a health professional, and an
attorney; a party who rejects a unanimous panel determination and then fails to prevail on
liability must pay "costs, reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses of the prevailing party incurred
in connection with the review panel and the trial").
133 See Levin, supra note 128, at 542 ("A rigorous, empirical study by the Federal Judicial
Center of court-annexed arbitration in the Northern District of California and the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania found that by referring cases to arbitration the incidence of trial was
reduced by approximately So%."); Peckham, supra note 103, at 270; Judicial Council of California, Report and Recommendation on Effectiveness of JudicialArbitration, in P. EBENER &
D. BETANCOURT, supra note 128, at A4 i, A65-A66 (The statewide trial de novo rate for cases
placed on an arbitration hearing list was 1.4% - although a controlled quantitative study was
unavailable, most attorneys, judges, and insurance representatives believed that the program
had appreciably diminished trial frequency.).
134 See Judicial Council of California, supra note 133, at A58-A59.
135 Deborah Hensler, who collected "consumer" impressions of the arbitration process for the
Rand Corporation, observed, "The explanation for this high level of satisfaction [even among
losers] is apparently attributable to litigants' satisfaction with the arbitration procedure itself.
We found that most litigants have a simple definition of what constitutes a fair dispute resolution
procedure: They want an opportunity to have their case heard and decided by an impartial
third party." D. HENSLER, supra note 128, at ii. Hensler also commented that litigants
generally conclude that arbitration involves "just the right amount of formality," that litigants
"don't view [arbitration] as being undignified or ... careless or, in any sense, a second-class
type of process," that these "[Ilitigants seem to view arbitration as giving them the same amount
of care and fairness as trial did," and that "where there's an edge, the edge seems to be in favor
of arbitration." National Conference Report, supra note 128, at 6; accord E. LIND & J. SHAPARD,
supra note 128, at 59 table 13 (reporting favorable assessments of court-annexed arbitration by
attorneys).
136 Chief Justice Burger noted, "[Inn the first two years after the jurisdictional level [of a
court-annexed arbitration program in Philadelphia] was increased to $io,ooo, the entire civil
calendar backlog was reduced from 48 months to 21 months." Burger, Isn't There a Better
Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 277 (x982); accord E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 128, at 76;
Judicial Council of California, supra note 133, at A65; Note, supra note 128, at 487, 494-95.
137 Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985).
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There are two fundamental differences between German and AngloAmerican civil procedure ....
First, the court rather than the parties' lawyers takes the main responsibility for gathering and sifting
evidence, although the lawyers exercise a watchful eye over the court's
work. Second, there is no distinction between pretrial and trial, between discovering evidence and presenting it. Trial is not a single
continuous event. Rather, the court gathers and evaluates evidence
over a series of hearings, as many as the circumstances require.138

As Langbein emphasizes, West Germany avoids the central inefficiency of American civil procedure, the separate pretrial and trial

proceedings that commonly require witnesses to tell their stories at
least twice.13 9 In addition, judicial control of the proceedings permits

the court to examine issues seriatim. A court may focus initially on
the issue most likely to prove dispositive, hear the opposing witnesses

on this issue, and resolve it -

sometimes obviating the need to

consider other issues. 140 Furthermore, judicial control of the trial
strongly counteracts the marked tendency of many aspects of Ameri-

can procedure to convert witnesses into partisans and to distort the
truth. In general, the noncontinuous, judge-dominated German trial
not only is more efficient than the American; it also has a different
tone - "the tone not of the theatre, but of a routine business meeting."141

The proposal that follows draws on West German procedure in
shaping what it calls the "first instance" trial. The procedures suggested for this trial, however, include some adversarial safeguards
lacking in West Germany. 142 In addition, the proposal provides for
135 Id. at 826 (footnote omitted).
139 American witnesses usually must tell their stories more often. Langbein noted "the
American practice of partisan interview and preparation, pretrial deposition, preparation for
trial, and examination and cross-examination at trial." Id. at 829.
140 In the American trial, by contrast, one side typically presents all its witnesses on all
potentially relevant issues before the other side is heard. But see FED. R. Crw. P. 42. More
importantly, Americans ordinarily must "discover for the entire case. [They] investigate everything that could possibly come up at trial, because once [they] enter the trial phase [they] can
seldom go back and search for further evidence." Langbein, supra note x37, at 831. In west
Germany, not only may the seriatim consideration of issues eliminate the need to explore some
anticipated issues, but "if the case takes an unexpected turn, the disadvantaged litigant can
count on developing his response in another hearing at a later time." Id. German procedure
thus has advantages in its treatment of both anticipated and unanticipated issues.
141Langbein, supra note 137, at 831.
142 Some of the ways in which West Germany combines adversarial and nonadversarial
procedures are likely to appear strange to American observers. A German court hears only
witnesses nominated by one side or the other (although a party is unlikely to refuse a judge's
request that he nominate additional witnesses). Oddly (at least from an American perspective),
German lawyers nominate witnesses without conducting any investigation of the facts of their
cases and without obtaining any pretrial discovery from their opponents. With rare exceptions,
these lawyers rely entirely on what their clients have told them. See id. at 827-28, 834.
This mixed procedure sometimes may result in a less adequate development of the facts than
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a traditional adversarial trial whenever a litigant is sufficiently dissatisfied with the outcome of the first proceeding to risk the expense
of a second. The proposal, in short, sacrifices some of the simplicity
and expedition of the German system to capture the virtues of a more
adversarial procedure; and before presenting the proposal, it is appropriate to explain why.
Langbein notes Lon Fuller's central argument for an adversary
system: "An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for
combatting th[e] natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms
of the familiar that which is not yet fully known."'1 43 What Langbein
characterizes as the risk of prejudgment, however, is only part of the
danger. Regardless of how slowly or how quickly a tribunal reaches
its decision, a single fact-gatherer is likely to overlook important
considerations and important data. Partly to counteract this tendency,
an adversary system divides the labor of marshaling evidence and
argument. 144
Langbein maintains that German civil procedure incorporates sufficient safeguards to obviate Fuller's objections. Most notably, West
Germany provides for participation by counsel in the trial and for de
novo review of factual as well as legal conclusions on appeal. In
practice, however, counsel's participation in the litigation of factual
issues at trial is extraordinarily restrained; 145 and West Germany's
appellate procedure may not be sufficiently adversarial to check the
either a more adversarial or more inquisitorial procedure would. On some occasions, it also
may encourage adversarial gamesmanship of the sort that troubles critics of American procedure.
A witness known only to one side whose testimony is likely to favor the other side seems more
likely to remain undiscovered in West Germany than in America. Indeed, both opposing lawyers
in West Germany may hesitate to nominate a witness when, in the absence of any contact with
the witness, each fears that the witness's testimony will be adverse to his position. The court's
questioning of other witnesses may reveal the need to hear the testimony of an absent witness,
or it may not.
Forbidding independent investigation of the facts seems a Draconian solution to the problems
of witness-tampering and "coaching" that arise when lawyers take an active role in gathering
and marshaling evidence. Indeed, in America, forbidding contact between potential i'vitnesses
and litigants or their representatives would raise substantial issues under the first amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech. Information provided by even a "coached" witness can further
the search for truth; undiscovered information cannot.
143 Fuller & Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.
J. ii59, 116o (1958), quoted in Langbein, supra note 137, at 844.
144 See Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 5o TEx. L. REv.
629, 637 (1972). I certainly do not deny that American procedure has taken this rationale for
an adversary system much too far. See generally M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980)
(criticizing America's excessively adversarial procedures and offering proposals for reform). In
general, I favor a "mixed" system of adversarial and nonadversarial procedure that departs to
some extent from both the German and American models. See, e.g., infra pp. 1845-54 (discussing how a "first instance" civil trial might proceed).
145Langbein noted that "counsel's role in eliciting evidence is greatly restricted" and that
"counsel are not prominent as examiners." Langbein, supra note 137, at 824, 828.
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dangers of an insufficiently adversarial trial procedure. Although appellate tribunals may hear witnesses as part of their review, they need
not do so. Instead, they may proceed on the basis of summaries of
untranscribed evidence that judges have dictated into trial dossiers. 146
Much of Langbein's study appears, in fact, to lend color to the
customary criticisms of nonadversarial procedure. Langbein describes
judges who "constantly look[ ] for the jugular - for the issue of law
or fact that might dispose of the case." 147 He observes, "[In this
business-like system of civil procedure the tradition is strong that the
court promotes compromise." 148 Indeed, judges are "strongly positioned to encourage a litigant to abandon a case that is turning out
judgto be weak or hopeless. ' 14 9 The vices of American "managerial
50
ing" appear to be magnified in German civil procedure.
Like other critics of American procedure,' 5 ' Langbein notes the
contrast between adversarial adjudication and "ordinary" decisionmaking. 15 2 Nevertheless, some differences between the adjudication
of two-party disputes and ordinary decisionmaking may make adversarial procedure more appropriate for one than for the other.
First, adversariness is endogenous in two-party disputes; it arises
naturally because both parties want to be heard and want to win.
Ordinary decisionmaking is different. A business executive deciding
how to respond to a competitor's marketing of a new product or a
college senior deciding whether to attend law school might seek out
champions of opposing viewpoints and invite them to present conflicting arguments. A judge, however, need not "draft" the adversaries
who appear before him. Lawyers oppose each other because they
represent real people with real conflicts.
Second, the adjudication of two-party disputes is much more likely
than ordinary decisionmaking to involve essentially binary, yes-or-no
choices. 153 A business executive typically confronts a range of options
in deciding how to respond to the marketing of a new product by a
146 See id. at 828, 856-57. One wonders whether this German appellate review is as de
novo in practice as it is in theory.
147 Id. at 830.
148Id. at 83 1
149 Id. at 832.
150 See supra pp. 1832-36.

Marc Galanter once noted in conversation a circumstance that
may have symbolic significance: American judges, perhaps because they are self-conscious about
the promotion of settlement, conduct this activity in chambers. German judges, by contrast,
initiate and conduct settlement conferences from the bench.
151 See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note 144, at I16-17; Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. o31, 1036 (z975).
152 See Langbein, supra note 137, at 844.
153 Indeed, our substantive law typically casts issues in binary form even when it might
better authorize a range of options, including that of "splitting the difference." See Coons,
Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise - The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L.
REV. 750 (1964).
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competitor. He may propose altering his firm's current product, reducing the price of this product, supplementing the current product
with a new one, mounting an advertising campaign stressing the
virtues of the existing product, mounting an advertising campaign
drawing explicit comparisons with the competitor's product, and more.
Similarly, a college senior may weigh the virtues of law school, business school, and a job that will enable him to defer the choice between
these graduate programs for another year. The executive's task and
the senior's task do not closely resemble that of a judge who must
decide whether Farmer Brown or Widow Green gets the colt. Although it would be artificial and unproductive to cast most issues of
"ordinary" decisionmaking in a binary mode, adversarial procedures
may remain appropriate for the resolution of genuinely binary, genu154
inely disputed issues.

Third and most important, when a business executive or a college
senior gives short shrift to an argument about how to respond to a
competitor's marketing initiative or about what field to study next
year, the person who advanced the argument may reply, "It's your
company," or "It's your life." When, however, a judge gives short
shrift to Farmer Brown's claim that he owns the colt, the judge does
not make a decision about "his" company or "his" life. He makes a
decision about Farmer Brown's rights. Decisions ordinarily are the
province of the parties most affected by them. Adjudication, however,
differs from ordinary decisionmaking in entrusting a choice to a person
who is not affected by it, a person who has special obligations to
those whose interests are at stake.
Arguments for adversarial procedure have emphasized its effect on
the quality of judicial decisionmaking. Because these arguments have
been powerful, their proponents may not have considered sufficiently
the "process" value of adversariness. Whether or not listening to
Farmer Brown's evidence will yield a better decision, the judge owes
Farmer Brown a hearing. Affording both sides a full opportunity to
present their evidence may not always improve the quality of the
outcome; but it is always an essential attribute of fairness, respect,
and courtesy.
Of course the contrast between German and American procedures
could be overdrawn. German jurists ordinarily do afford litigants
ample opportunity to be heard; and before embracing my misgivings
about German civil procedure unreservedly, one should note that they
do not appear to have been voiced in Germany.15 5 One should note
as well that the current American alternative to an informal, judge154 Cf. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 395-98 (I978)
(arguing that "sufficiently polycentric" issues are not appropriately resolved through adjudication).
155 See Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure 1, 71 HAsv. L.
REv. 1193, 1224 (1958).
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dominated trial is years of waiting in a courthouse queue for a more
adversarial trial. Still, a system in which judges strive more vigorously than German judges apparently do to withhold judgment until
all the evidence has been heard has its virtues - virtues that may
justify a sacrifice of parsimony and expedition.
B. The Plan
i. "First Instance" and "Second Instance" Trials. - Each of the
procedures described above seems deficient in a significant respect.
German civil procedure and American "court-annexed arbitration"
offer simplified forms of adjudication and point the way toward making adjudicative services more available. Nevertheless, German procedure appears to aggravate the dangers of managerial judging.
Court-annexed arbitration does not aggravate these dangers, but it
does little to reduce them or to promote the effective judicial control
of pretrial activities.
The English use of masters to conduct pretrial proceedings (and,
to a lesser extent, the American use of magistrates for the same
purpose) differentiates the judicial functions at trial and pretrial proceedings. This separation indicates how Americans can have both a
closer judicial supervision of pretrial activity and a more effective
corrective for the dangers of judicial case management. Nevertheless,
the separation of trial and pretrial functions does not simplify the trial
process or make adjudicative services more available.
When one views these procedures together, however, it is necessary
only to fit two halves of a picture puzzle together. The assembled
puzzle suggests a resolution of some dilemmas of American procedure.
Were pretrial proceedings as closely supervised as they should be,
it would not take much to transform these proceedings into a preliminary form of adjudication. To some extent, this preliminary adjudication might be modeled after German and court-annexed arbitration procedures. Similarly, it would not take much to transform courtannexed arbitration, a preliminary form of adjudication, into an effective form of pretrial case management, one that would provide
effective judicial control of evidence-gathering and evidence-sharing
activity.
Officials who have devised court-annexed arbitration programs
have considered how best to fit these programs with existing schemes
of judicial case management. For example, these officials have considered whether the parties should conduct discovery before or after
the arbitration. Some planners, in fact, have proposed a two-stage
process - some discovery before and some after.15 6 The officials do

156 Peckham, supra note 103, at 267-71; cf. MacAlister & Scanlan, Health Claims Arbitration
in Maryland: The Experiment Has Failed, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 481, 508 (1985) (describing
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not seem to have considered a better preposition - during. The
proposal that follows would treat the initial statements of witnesses
both as testimony at a "first instance" trial and as discovery for a
possible "second instance" proceeding. It would add only one thing
to existing forms of preliminary adjudication: pretrial case management. Similarly, it would add only one thing to existing forms of
pretrial case management: adjudication. After indicating how the
process would work, this Article will consider some objections to it,
including the objection that this procedure would unconstitutionally
burden the exercise of the right to a jury trial.
2. A Two-Tiered Trial System in Operation. The story would
begin in a familiar way. A lawsuit would be assigned to a judge, and
the judge's role at the pleading stage would not differ from the role
that judges currently perform. The "first instance" judge would be
empowered to pass on the sufficiency of the pleadings, to permit
amendments, to dismiss cases in which plaintiffs had failed to state
valid claims, and to enter default judgments.' 5 7 Thereafter, one form
of pretrial discovery would occur without direct judicial supervision.
Either party could, if he chose, submit written interrogatories to his
opponent to learn the opponent's position on specific issues and to
identify potential sources of evidence within the opponent's control.
A party who received an opponent's interrogatories would answer
those to which he had no objection prior to further judicial proceedings.
When a party objected to an opponent's interrogatories, the firstinstance judge would determine the scope of that party's obligation to
respond.' 5 8 After the completion of this preliminary "wave" of discovery, no additional discovery would occur without direct judicial
15 9
involvement, approval, and participation.
the waste incurred by the reopening of discovery and the relitigation of discovery disputes
following medical malpractice arbitration).
157 This proposal does not contemplate assigning the role of first-instance judge to a "parajudge" or a "judge junior grade." The function of the first-instance judge would not be to play
picador to a second-instance judge. To the contrary, the first-instance judge ordinarily would
make more sensitive decisions than the second-instance judge. The usual function of the secondinstance judge would be to conduct a jury trial after most critical legal issues in a case had
been resolved. The functions of the first-instance judge also might require stronger managerial
skills and greater sensitivity in interpersonal relations than would the functions performed by
the second-instance judge.
Judges selected in the way that American judges currently are selected might not be the
ideal figures to perform the functions of first-instance judges. See Langbein, supra note 137, at
848-55. Nevertheless, the apparent success of court-annexed arbitration programs staffed by
"parajudges" who sometimes are selected haphazardly counsels against giving extraordinary
weight to this objection.
158 Cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND § 21.421 (1985) ("wave" discovery); id.
§ 21.461 ("Interrogatories as Preliminary to Other Discovery"); id. § 21.463 ("Contention Interrogatories").
159 In some cases, this closer judicial supervision might reduce the amount of pretrial evidence
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Once a litigant had reviewed his opponent's responses to interrogatories and completed the investigation of his own case, he would
prepare a "trial document" listing all witnesses and other sources of
evidence that he wished the tribunal to consider during its firstinstance trial. This document would set forth reasons for consulting
each of the sources listed. When, for example, a party anticipated
that a particular witness's testimony would favor his position, his trial
document would offer a brief summary of the witness's anticipated
testimony. When a party wished the tribunal to consult a witness or
a source of evidence whose testimony or contents were unknown
(typically a source within the control of the opposing party), he would
set forth his reasons for believing that the source was likely to yield
relevant evidence. 160
After receiving each party's trial document, the judge would hold
a conference with the parties and determine what evidence to consider
and in what order. 161 The judge could order that documents in the
possession of one party be submitted to an opposing party for inspection so that this party could cull relevant material for submission to
the court. The examination of witnesses, however, would occur only
before the court. 162
Rules of court would admonish the judge to conduct the firstinstance trial as a single, continuous proceeding whenever possible. 163
In simple cases, the court would set aside an appropriate period of
time and order the witnesses nominated in the parties' trial documents
to appear. 164 Armed with these documents, the judge would conduct

gathering - a development that only some lawyers would be likely to regret. Judges might
permit "fishing" only in reasonably promising waters.
160 Cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND § 21.33 (1985) (techniques to clarify,
narrow, and resolve issues - including "requiring ... that the parties present a detailed outline
of their contentions, with supporting facts and evidence").
In the absence of a justifiable reason for the omission of a source of evidence (or a showing
of both an exceptional need and a lack of prejudice to the opposing party), neither the firstinstance nor the second-instance tribunal would ordinarily consider a source not listed in a
party's trial document. Of course, as a case progressed, a party could supplement his trial
document by adding sources of which he could not have known earlier.
161FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) ("Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order
tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and schedule for
discovery .... ").
162 The parties might continue informal investigation on their own, although they would not
have any means of forcing an opponent's or a witness's cooperation. I do not propose a
restriction on contact between attorneys and witnesses of the sort that exists in West Germany.
See supra note 142. Of course the extent and nature of a witness's contact with a lawyer could
be considered in evaluating his testimony.
163 Cf. Langbein, supra note 137, at 826 n. 9 (describing a similar provision in the West
German Code of Civil Procedure, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] § 272(1)).
164 The court could refuse to consider a source of evidence listed in a party's trial document
only if the document revealed no reason to believe that the source would yield relevant evidence,
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the initial examination of the witnesses. In proposing a somewhat
comparable form of adjudication for criminal cases, I noted:
In light of his limited information and his need to remain impartial,
a judge's examination of witnesses ordinarily would be cursory. He
would... invite the witness's narrative testimony, ask obvious questions, and - prompted by counsel if necessary - intervene when the
testimony strayed from relevant issues. A more detailed probing of
the witness's testimony would remain the task of the opposing attorneys, each of whom could cross-examine the witness in turn. 165
By permitting witnesses to give their versions of the "whole truth" in
narrative form before opposing advocates tested what they said, this
format would promote the dignified treatment of witnesses. In addition, it would "encourage[ ] the emergence of truth, not simply from
the clash of two distinct perspectives, but from the interplay of
three. "166
In exceptional cases, the first-instance trial might be noncontinuous. Noncontinuous proceedings would be appropriate in complex
cases, other cases in which it proved unusually difficult to schedule
the appearance of witnesses at the same proceeding, and cases in
which hearing evidence on one issue might obviate the need to consider other issues. Indeed, in some situations, it might be more convenient for the court and the attorneys to travel to the witnesses than
for the witnesses to travel to the court. The court might, in fact, take
the testimony of some witnesses by telephone or through audio-visual
wizardry (though only on the record and only in the presence of the
16 7
parties or their lawyers).
Judicial control of the order of proof at trial would permit the
court to capture some of the virtues of German civil procedure. Separate issues could be treated separately - for example, by hearing
the testimony of opposing expert witnesses immediately after one another. Indeed, the format of the trial might encourage the first-instance judge to exercise an option long recognized (and long disused)
in American law - that of appointing an independent expert to
68
supplement the evidence of party-nominated experts. 1
Professor Langbein recently suggested one reason for the disuse of
this power: Until the emergence of "managerial judging," American
judges were unlikely to recognize the need for nonpartisan expertise
until a trial was underway. Then it was ordinarily too late to make
if the source proved unavailable, or if the court concluded that it would be burdensome and
oppressive to require an opposing party or a nonlitigant to produce this source.
165 Alschuler, supra note 5,at 0O4.
166 Id. at 1003.
167 Forcing witnesses to ride airplanes and to wait idly in courthouse corridors is not an
indispensible requisite of justice.
168 See FED. R. EvD. 706; Fink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own
Expert Witness, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. r95 (1956).
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the necessary arrangements. 1 69 The submission of the parties' trial
documents followed by a conference on what evidence to hear might
prompt both an earlier and a clearer judicial recognition of the need
for court-appointed experts. Indeed, court rules should direct the
judge to consider this option whenever either party nominated an
70
expert witness. 1
Like a judge in West Germany, a first-instance judge could hear
the evidence on potentially dispositive issues at the outset. Indeed, if
he were persuaded that a final adjudication of one of these issues
would be very likely to resolve the case, he could certify the appropriateness of an immediate, second-instance trial of the issue. Further
proceedings might be delayed until this limited second-instance trial
171
had been held.
Because the first-instance judge would not have final adjudicative
authority, his participation in settlement discussions would not carry
the troublesome message that judicial participation typically carries
today. 172 Most litigants probably would value the judge's input; and
in the absence of any objection, he should provide it.
Some litigants, however, might hope to. treat the first-instance
adjudication as a final adjudication and might be concerned that a
failure to yield to judicial suggestions would affect the judge's later
rulings. Other litigants (probably not many) might be uninterested in
settlement. A litigant who sought a principled resolution of his dispute
should get it without resistance, equivocation, or cajolery by the
judge. Accordingly, a litigant who objected to judicial mediation
might file a statement of objection with the clerk of court. Once the
clerk informed the judge that this statement had been filed, the judge
should refrain from mediation. Moreover, as clear assurance against
bias or reprisal, both the clerk and the opposing party should be
required to keep confidential the identity of the party who had filed
73
this objection. 1
169 See Langbein, supra note 137, at 841.
170 Cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND § 21.481 (1985) (Disclosure of expert
opinions "should be made sufficiently in adavnce of trial ... for the court to consider, if
).
warranted, selection of a court-appointed expert ....
171Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (allowing a court to order a separate trial of any claim or issue
as long as the right to trial by jury is preserved).
172 See supra pp. 1828-30, 1835-36. A substantial majority of the i9oo federal-court litigators surveyed by Wayne D. Brazil agreed that settlement conferences should be conducted by
judges other than the judges scheduled to preside at trial. IV. BRAZIL, supra note 104, at 5-6.
Moreover, "[cloncern about the propriety of judicial participation in settlement all but evaporates
. . . when the judicial officer who hosts the settlement conference is not the judge to whom the
case has been assigned for trial . . . ." Id. at 84.
173 If the danger that court clerks might not preserve confidentiality seemed substantial,
rulemakers could turn to a different "masking" procedure - requiring the parties to file a joint
statement of objection whenever either party requested this joint objection.
I would not expect litigants to object frequently to judicial mediation. Apart from the
situations noted in the text, however, parties whose cases were assigned to judges who routinely
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After gathering and considering the evidence, the first-instance
judge would resolve the case and prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law of the same sort that judges currently prepare after
nonjury trials. Although most rules of evidence would be inapplicable
at first-instance trials, 174 the judge should be directed not to enter any
judgment or to make any finding that a second-instance tribunal
limited by the rules of evidence could not reasonably enter or make.
No purpose would be served by forcing a litigant to proceed to a
second-instance trial simply to obtain the benefit of the rules of evi75
dence. 1

Either party could appeal the judge's rulings on questions of law
(including questions of his abuse of discretion in refusing to consider
particular sources of evidence). Jurisdiction over this appeal would
be vested in an appellate court, not in a second-instance trial court.
The need for appellate proceedings could be obviated by authorizing
trials de novo of legal as well as factual issues before second-instance
tribunals, but there are at least four reasons for rejecting this procedure.
First, although a full trial de novo might seem the ultimate safeguard against abuse, it would preclude direct review of rulings made
by the first-instance judge. Judges may be more careful and less
abusive when they sense that other judges are likely to consider the
propriety of their actions (rather than simply cast these actions aside
and start over). The prospect of direct review tends to deter judicial
misconduct in all cases; it does not simply provide a corrective in
176
those cases that happen to reach higher courts.
Second, a trial de novo might itself be followed by an appeal on
issues of law. Three tribunals rather than two might be required to
pass on a legal issue before it reached authoritative appellate resolution. In many situations, direct appellate review would be a more
efficient and more economical procedure.

substituted pressures to settle for the performance of their judicial duties might find the procedure
useful.
174 The first-instance judge would pass on claims of privilege and could refuse to hear
irrelevant evidence, but he would not decline to consider hearsay or other evidence on the
ground that its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value.
175 In other words, although the judge would not rule on evidentiary objections during the
proceedings, a party might argue at the end of the proceedings that some or all of the evidence

supporting a particular proposition would be inadmissible at a second-instance trial. Asking a
judge to disregard what he had heard would be unrealistic, but determining whether a particular
finding would be supported by the weight of the admissible evidence would not be an impossible

feat.
176 See S. BING & S. ROSENFELD, THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE IN THE LOWER CRIMINAL
COURTS OF METROPOLITAN BOSTON: A REPORT BY THE LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS UNDER LAW TO THE GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE o6 (1971); Alschuler, Book Appraisal, 66 LAW LIBR. J. 122 (1973).
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Third, a full trial de novo would be likely to involve the secondinstance tribunal in issues of case management. For example, the
second-instance tribunal might be required to determine whether to
order the production of documents that the first-instance judge had
not ordered a litigant to produce. The court might find it necessary
to explore the issues of the case in depth in order to resolve this
issue. 1 77 The separation of first-instance and second-instance tribunals
is designed to insulate second-instance tribunals from involvement in
pretrial case management and thus to limit the risks and dangers of
managerial judging. Assigning the appellate function to an appellate
court would permit an authoritative resolution of case management
issues before a case ever came to the second-instance trial tribunal.
Fourth, the authoritative appellate resolution of legal issues might
make the parties more willing to accept the first-instance adjudication
as final. It might thereby reduce the number of occasions on which
a party found it necessary to subject his opponent to the delays, risks,
burdens, and expenses of prolonged trial proceedings.
If an appellate court reversed a ruling by a first-instance trial
judge, it could remand the case for further proceedings in the firstinstance tribunal. In some circumstances, however, it might be more
appropriate for the court to send the case directly to a second-instance
tribunal for trial. When the parties agreed on the appropriate forum
for further proceedings, their choice would be respected. When they
disagreed, they could argue the issue to the appellate court, which
then would determine the appropriate procedure.
In the absence of an appeal on legal issues, the second-instance
judge would be required to treat legal rulings by the first-instance
judge as settled "law of the case."' 178 This judge's responsibility for
resolving questions of law would be confined to questions that had
not arisen during the first-instance proceeding - typically, evidentiary
79
questions and the formulation of instructions to the jury. 1
A party dissatisfied with the outcome of the first-instance trial
could obtain a trial de novo of factual issues in the second-instance
tribunal. Procedures at this trial would not differ from those employed
in American trials today. In time, if the mode of examining witnesses
and other procedures employed in first-instance trials established their
worth, they might merit adoption at second-instance trials as well.
Nevertheless, when law grows complex, internal reform sometimes is
177Direct rather than de novo review of first-instance rulings by the second-instance tribunal
would involve the same difficulty.
17s So would other judges who might consider the case in later proceedings. In the absence
of exceptional circumstances justifying collateral review, a party who had failed to appeal an
adverse legal ruling should be bound by it thereafter.
179Indeed, the second-instance judge might be constrained by decisions that had gone before
even in ruling on evidentiary objections and challenged instructions.
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a less promising corrective than establishing new tribunals without
barnacles ("courts of equity" rather than "courts of law"). If these
new courts succeed, the older courts are likely to get the message. In
part, the establishment of first-instance tribunals would reflect this
relatively unthreatening approach to reform.
At both the first-instance and second-instance proceedings, costshifting, "loser pays" rules would allocate the parties' litigation expenses. Prior to adjudication by the first-instance tribunal, either party
could make a formal offer of settlement. The clerk of court would
record this offer without revealing its contents to the judge. This
offer would provide the baseline for measuring "loss" under the "loser
pays" rule applicable to first-instance proceedings. Specifically, if the
tribunal's judgment proved more favorable to a party than his settlement offer, his opponent would be the "loser" and would be required
to bear reasonable litigation expenses that the offeror had incurred
after the filing of the offer. 18 0 Similarly, a party who "lost" the secondinstance trial - in the sense that its outcome was less favorable to
him than the outcome of the first proceeding - would bear all reasonable expenses incurred by his opponent in litigating the second
proceeding. 181

190 For example, the plaintiff might record an offer to accept $ioo,ooo in settlement, and
the defendant might record an offer to pay $5o,ooo. If the plaintiff then recovered only $25,000,
he would be the "loser" and would be required to bear the defendant's litigation expenses. It
could be seen in retrospect that he had forced the defendant to trial unnecessarily. If the
plaintiff recovered $125,000, the defendant would be the "loser" and would be required to bear
the plaintiff's litigation expenses.
If the plaintiff recovered an amount between $5o,0oo and $ioo,ooo, either of two principles
might determine the allocation of litigation expenses. One principle would rest on the proposition
that neither party had "lost" at trial. Neither had forced his opponent to engage in litigation
unnecessarily. This principle would suggest that the traditional "American rule" should control;
each party should bear his own litigation expenses. The second principle would focus on the
midpoint between the two settlement offers ($75,ooo in this example). This second principle
would treat the defendant as the "loser" if the ultimate award were higher than this amount
and the plaintiff as the "loser" if it were lower. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 68 (treating an offer in
settlement as the baseline for determining loss under a "loser pays" rule but applying the principle
inequitably to only one of the parties); Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, i6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 93 (i986) (arguing that rule 68 "benefit[s] defendants and harm[s] plaintiffs by shifting
downward the relevant settlement range").
181 Of course, if a party offered a settlement more favorable to his opponent than the outcome
of the first-instance proceeding and the opponent nevertheless persisted in seeking a trial de
novo, the settlement offer rather than the outcome of the first-instance proceeding would be the
appropriate baseline for measuring "loss" under a "loser pays" rule.
Situations might arise in which the "winner" of a second-instance trial would not have
recovered litigation expenses at the first-instance trial - and might in fact have been required
to pay the litigation expenses of his opponent. If this party would have been entitled to recover
litigation expenses (or would have been relieved of the obligation to pay his opponent's expenses)
had the second-instance verdict been returned at the first-instance trial, the second-instance
tribunal could include an award of first-instance trial expenses in the winner's recovery.
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Although application of the "loser pays" rule would be unaffected
by which party had sought the second-instance trial, "user fees" (or
"court costs" reflecting the full expenses of adjudication to the government) would be imposed only on a party who had sought this second
trial unsuccessfully. For reasons that this Article has indicated, 182 the
costs of first-instance adjudication ought to be substantially subsidized.
In the absence of a finding that a litigant had abused the process,
perhaps first-instance litigants should not be required to pay filing fees
or court costs at all. Moreover, the reasons for governmental subsidization would extend to a litigant who had found it necessary to
resort to a second-instance proceeding to vindicate his rights.
Arguments for subsidization have little force, however, when a
litigant already has been afforded one subsidized trial that appears
not to have been defective. Moreover, the interests of the party who
has not sought review are at stake along with those of the taxpayers.
Losing litigants who subject their opponents to the burdens of further
proceedings without any better reason than the desire for a second
shot ought not be subsidized in this activity. Partly to protect prevailing parties from unnecessary second-instance litigation, 8 3 a litigant who sought and then lost a second-instance trial ordinarily ought
to be assessed "court costs" reflecting the expenses of the second84
instance proceeding to the government.1
First-instance trials would enable litigants to obtain impartial adjudication without the delay and expense of current procedures. Many
litigants undoubtedly would find these first-instance proceedings sufficient. Nevertheless, litigants who viewed themselves as "little guys"
involved in lawsuits with "big guys" - a category composed in part
of personal injury plaintiffs - might be reluctant to accept firstinstance adjudication. The sense that jurors are more likely than
judges to favor "the little guy" often might prompt these litigants to
insist on second-instance trials. The University of Chicago Jury Project concluded, however, that - contrary to popular impression juries are no more likely than judges to rule in favor of plaintiffs on

182 See supra pp. 1811-17.
183 Shifting the costs of litigation itself tends to achieve this objective, but many of the
burdens of litigation are nonfinancial.
184 A court should have discretion to relieve a litigant of this burden when it would work
economic hardship and when the litigant had presented issues that were worthy of secondinstance adjudication. As Justice Cardozo once observed, "[H]eavier burdens should be imposed
where there is evidence of bad faith or mere dogged perversity." Letter from Benjamin N.
Cardozo to H.H. Nordlinger, quoted in G. HELLMAN, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO: AMERICAN
JUDGE I5o (1940).

My cost-allocation suggestions are not critical to the proposal for a two-tier trial system.
Current American practices - including the rule requiring each party to bear his own litigation
expenses - could be retained without eliminating the proposal's value. Like many other of the
proposal's features, its cost-allocation suggestions are a subordinate and easily altered detail.
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issues of liability. 185 At the same time, juries frequently - and in
fact usually - award larger damages than judges consider appropri186
ate.
The use of "damages guidelines" of the sort proposed in this Article, 187 however, could reduce the tendency of "little-guy" litigants to
demand second-instance trials. The plaintiffs' personal injury bar
would be likely to resist the use of these guidelines at jury trials; but
if the content of the guidelines were shaped by recent jury awards,
plaintiffs' lawyers might not resist use of the guidelines only at nonjury
trials. This use could reduce the capriciousness of damage awards
while assuring that judicial awards were, in the aggregate, no lower
than jury awards. To the extent that the lawyers for some litigants
continued to sense an advantage in jury proceedings, they would be
required to weigh this advantage against the delay and expense that
these proceedings might involve for their clients.
The procedures described above could be altered to meet needs
for distinctive adjudicative services. For example, if both parties
wished to obtain a jury trial and did not seek the discovery that a
first-instance proceeding would provide, they should be permitted to
bypass the first-instance trial altogether. Similarly, if they wished the
first-instance tribunal to supply some pretrial services but to stop short
of adjudication on the basis of all the evidence, they should be afforded this option. Moreover, just as the first-instance trial could be
contracted to meet some special needs, it could be expanded to meet
others. In complex cases, a phased series of first-instance proceedings,
each preceded by the preparation of a set of trial documents, might
prove appropriate.
3. Two Objections -

(a) Cost. -

In cases in which litigants

obtained both first-instance and second-instance trials, the procedures
suggested above might make adjudication more complicated and expensive rather than less.' 8 8 Nevertheless, increased expenditures in
cases that traveled the course from filing to second-instance judgment
might be more than offset by reduced expenditures in cases that did
not go this distance only because impartial adjudication had been
afforded at first-instance trials.1 89
15 See Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1O55, io65 (1964).

186 See id.
187 See supra pp. 1825-28.
188 Videotaping the presentation of evidence at first-instance trials and then using the recorded evidence at second-instance trials when neither party objected (and perhaps even over
objection in some circumstances) could, however, reduce the cost of second-instance proceedings.
See generally McCrystal & Maschari, Will Electronic Technology Take the Witness Stand?, ii
U. TOL. L. REv. 239 (1980).
189 As far as it goes, the experience of court-annexed arbitration programs supports this
optimistic view. Even when first-instance procedures are substantially less thorough, law-bound,
and safeguarded than the first-instance procedures proposed here, most cases end after an initial
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The proposed two-tier trial system might indeed cost more than
the current trial system - but not because it would involve more
complicated procedures in cases resolved by juries. Few cases today
survive the boobytraps on the road to jury trial; and although a twotier system would promote more active case management and might
thereby defuse some of the bombs, the system would not make jury
trials more frequent. If the proposal did increase the costs of America's adjudicative system, it would do so only because it provided
simple, straightforward adjudicative services to people who currently
do not get them. In a civilized society, the price of supplying these
services is worth paying.
(b) Burdening the Right to Jury Trial. - Forty-eight of the fifty
states190 and the federal government 1 9 1 provide a constitutional right
to jury trial in various sorts of civil actions. Several of the procedures
suggested here - the requirement that litigants submit to first-instance
trials before exercising the right to jury trial, the requirement that
they submit to inferlocutory appellate review, and the requirement
that they bear the cost of second-instance proceedings if they lose would be likely to make exercise of the right to jury trial less frequent.
Nevertheless, these procedures would not exert unconstitutional pressure on the exercise of the right. 192

arbitration. Those that go further usually end before trial. See supra p. 1840. Moreover, even
when litigants risk only trivial cost-shifting sanctions by proceeding to second-instance adjudication, few of them do. The relevance of this experience is limited, however, by the fact that
current court-annexed arbitration programs are confined to relatively small-stakes cases.
Mandatory arbitration programs for medical malpractice cases are relatively new. If these
programs were to lead to a significant reduction in the number of jury trials (even in highstakes cases), that experience would provide strong evidence that a similar reduction in jury
trials could be expected under this proposal. Nevertheless, malpractice plaintiffs ("little guys"
doing battle with medical professionals and insurance companies) may be unusually likely to
demand jury trial. A recent evaluation of a state malpractice-arbitration scheme without costshifting sanctions proclaimed this scheme a "failure" because litigants appealed more than half
of the arbitrators' awards. See MacAlister & Scanlan, supra note i56, at 50i. Nevertheless,
this evaluation did not indicate how many of the appeals actually led to trials de novo. In a
non-cost-shifting scheme, litigants with little prospect of bettering the arbitrators' awards through
litigation may appeal simply in the hope that the threatened imposition of additional litigation
expenses will induce settlement on terms more favorable than the initial awards. Whatever the
significance of this experience, "little-guy, big-guy" litigation is distinctive. The failure of malpractice arbitration to reduce the demand for jury trial would not demonstrate that an arbitration
program applicable to the entire range of civil litigation would have no greater impact.
190 The two exceptions are Louisiana and Colorado. See James, Trial by Jury and the New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 1022, 1022 & n.4 (1936).
191 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Unlike the right to jury trial in criminal cases, see Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the right to jury trial in civil cases has never been "incorporated" in the due process clause and made applicable to the states.
192 At the same time, these procedures are designed to confine civil juries to the role
reasonably regarded as essential under federal and state constitutions and thus to limit the
overproceduralization that infects our jury-trial system.
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In Ludwig v. Massachusetts,1 93 a criminal defendant challenged
the constitutionality of a state procedure that required him to submit
to a nonjury trial before he could exercise his constitutional right to
jury trial. The Supreme Court rejected his challenge. Although Ludwig does not itself establish the constitutionality of the two-tier system
proposed here, the circumstance that differentiates the proposed system from the one upheld in Ludwig should not lead to a different
result.
The Court's opinion in Ludwig emphasized that the defendant had
an almost cost-free option. He could have submitted to a finding of
guilt in the first-instance proceeding and then obtained a trial de novo
before a jury. The defendant was not required to "pursue, in any
real sense, a defense at the lower tier."'1 94 A civil litigant in the twotier system proposed in this Article would not have the same option.
If this litigant's opponent wished to discover evidence during the firstinstance trial, the litigant would be required to supply it.
The obligation to present evidence during a first-instance trial
differentiates the system proposed here from the one challenged in
Ludwig. Nevertheless, this circumstance itself indicates the untenability of a claim that the proposed procedure would violate the Constitution. It is too late in the twentieth century to assert that requiring
a civil litigant to disclose evidence to his opponent in advance of a
jury trial unconstitutionally burdens the exercise of his right to that
trial. 195 Ludwig established that the entry of judgment at a firstinstance proceeding does not unduly burden the exercise of the right,
and the suggested first-instance procedure adds to the entry of judg96
ment only a requirement of compliance with discovery obligations. 1
Similarly, ordering losing litigants to bear court costs is a wellestablished practice, and so is allowing interlocutory appellate review
of some legal rulings in advance of trial. The proposed system would
extend these practices, but not to the point at which they would
operate unfairly.
Were government to attempt to "sell" jury trials at a profit, the
practice undoubtedly would violate the Constitution. 197 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court generally has permitted governments to recoup
193 427 U.S. 618 (1976).

194Id. at 626.
195 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 (concerning depositions and discovery).
196 In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (i888), the Supreme Court invalidated a two-tier

criminal trial system on the ground that it infringed the right to jury trial. In Ludwig, however,
the Court confined Callan to federal criminal prosecutions - those in which the distinctively
phrased jury trial guarantee of article III applies. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("[T]he Trial
of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury...."); Ludwig, 427 U.S. at
629-30.

197See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw,
8i HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1445-49 (1968).
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expenditures caused directly by the exercise of constitutional rights. 198
The Court has read the Constitution to require governmental subsidization in only a few situations; even then, it has mandated subsidization only for the indigent. 199
One can imagine situations in which the Court probably ought to
go further; an unqualified declaration that all except the indigent can
be required to pay their way in exercising constitutional rights might
be too broad. 20 0 Nevertheless, constitutional rights ordinarily are
satisfied when governments refrain from interference; they do not
imply an obligation to subsidize. The reasonable imposition of court
costs proposed
in this Article would not justify a departure from that
20 1
principle.

198 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (194) (upholding a license fee to
recoup governmental expenses caused by speech). But cf. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (i943) (holding a "tax" on speech invalid). For criticism of the Supreme Court's approach,
see Goldberger, A Reconsideration of Cox v. New Hampshire: Can DemonstratorsBe Required
to Pay the Costs of Using America's Public Forums?, 62 TEx. L. REv. 403 (1983).
199 Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent criminal defendant entitled
to appointed counsel), with Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) (defendant, no longer indigent,
required to reimburse the state for the costs of counsel). See also Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S.
656 (1973) (per curiam) (indigent not entitled to waiver of an appellate filing fee in a civil case);
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (indigent not entitled to waiver of a filing fee in a
bankruptcy action); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigent entitled to waiver of
a filing fee in a divorce action).
200 For example, although our legal system requires nonindigent criminal defendants to pay
their attorneys' fees even when they are acquitted, requiring acquitted defendants to pay the
costs incurred by the government as a result of their exercise of the right to jury trial might
seem unconscionable. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1918(b) (1982) (permitting the imposition of court costs
only on convicted defendants). An imposition of court costs on acquitted defendants might in
fact violate the sixth amendment guarantee of jury trial. Forcing these defendants to answer
unproven criminal charges would not have been done for their benefit.
In deciding whether a similar right of subsidization for nonindigent litigants should extend
to losing parties in second-instance civil proceedings, an examination of the history of the civil
jury is instructive. The common law right to jury trial did not include the right to a cost-free
trial or even to a subsidized trial. To the contrary, officeholders obtained substantial profits by
exacting fees from litigants at approximately 4o different stages of the proceedings. The requirement that the losing party bear the winner's costs ordinarily placed the ultimate burden of
these fees on nonprevailing parties. See C. Francis, Strategy and Institution: An Analysis of
Common Law Debt Collection 38-40, 87-107 (1986) (unpublished manuscript); see also M.
BLATCHER, THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH 1450-1550, at 34-46 (1978); J. SAYER, LAW OF
COSTS (2d ed. 1777).

Various statutes relieved paupers of the obligation to pay costs but sometimes only on the
condition that they "suffer such other punishment as appeared reasonable to the judges." 4 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 538 (3d ed. 1945). Holdsworth reports, "In the
seventeenth century the practice appears to have been to tax the costs, and, if the costs were
not paid, the court could adjudge that the plaintiff be whipped." Id. Although this history
need not control a modern court's interpretation of the right to jury trial in civil cases, the
common law history obviously poses no obstacle to upholding the reasonable imposition of court
costs on nonprevaling parties.
201 In criminal cases, the Supreme Court has countenanced astonishing burdens on the
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VII. CONCLUSION

Apart from questions of constitutionality, critics might object that
the proposed procedures could lead to a substitution of nonjury for
jury trials in all but a small minority of civil cases. To the extent
that litigants found a simpler, less burdensome form of adjudication
more attractive, however, the displacement might not be regrettable.
The jury would remain available as a safeguard or "backstop." It
would perform the historic role that the Supreme Court emphasized
in Duncan v. Louisiana20 2 - that of guarding against "the compliant,
20 3
biased, or eccentric judge."

More importantly, critics who feared that this proposal could lead
to the demise of the civil jury apparently would have missed a secret
that almost everyone knows - a secret that the first half of this
Article rebroadcast. The civil jury, if not yet dead, is in extremis. It
has been brought to its deathbed by existing procedures, not by the
procedures proposed here. This institution has been bludgeoned by
discovery wars, lengthy queues, high attorneys' fees, satellite hearings,
anti-trial conferences, and the world's most extensive collection of
exercise of the right to jury trial. It has upheld even waivers of that right induced by the threat
of capital punishment. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (197o); North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). But see
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (I968) (invalidating a clause of Federal Kidnapping Act
because that clause permitted a death sentence only after a jury trial). After upholding the
gratuitous and almost unlimited pressures of current plea bargaining practices, it would seem
unconscionable (and hypocritical) for the Court to balk at the limited, cost-related consequences
that this Article has suggested should follow unsuccessful exercise of the right to jury trial in
civil cases.
202 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
203 Id. at 156. Under the proposed procedure, a losing litigant could seek a jury trial when
he sensed that the danger noted in Duncan had materialized at a first-instance proceeding. He
would be unlikely to demand a jury in the absence of a reason to believe that a jury's assessment
of the evidence would differ from that of the first-instance judge.
One caveat to this conclusion merits mention. In a case in which the stakes were very high,
even a small chance of victory at a second-instance proceeding might lead a losing litigant to
run the risk that he would bear the expenses incurred by the government and his opponent in
conducting this proceeding. A io% chance of recovering one billion dollars could justify a 90%
chance of not recovering this sum but of paying ten million dollars in court costs and litigation
expenses instead. Nevertheless, very-large-stakes cases tend to be complex cases, and the extent
to which the constitutional right to jury trial extends to complex civil cases remains unsettled.
Compare In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9 th Cir. 1979) (complex civil cases
are not exempt from the jury-trial requirement), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (198o), with In re
Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d IO69 (3d Cir. i98o) (the seventh amendment
does not guarantee a jury when the proceedings are so complex as to render the jury ineffective).
Were the right to jury trial held inapplicable to complex cases and were the first-instance trials
proposed in this Article to prove fair and appropriate mechanisms for resolving these cases,
state and federal legislatures might consider converting these first-instance proceedings into final
proceedings. After an appropriate period of experimentation, legislatures also might consider
restricting the right to second-instance trials in equitable actions (proceedings to which the right
to jury trial has never extended).
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cumbersome procedures. In recent decades, as judges and scholars
have decried the litigation explosion, as civil filings have increased,
as the number of lawyers per capita has nearly doubled, and as
substantive rights have expanded at an astonishing pace, the limited
evidence available suggests that the absolute number of jury trials in
the state courts has declined. 20 4 In the federal courts, although there
has been no decline, the percentage of cases terminated during or after
trial has fallen from 15.2 in 1940 to 10.3 in 196o to 6.5 in 198020 5 to
5.0 in i984.206 In our current system of civil procedure, these figures

reflect not merely the demise of the jury but also the demise of
adjudication. 20 7 A two-tier trial procedure would not save the jury,
but it might revive America's moribund system of adjudication.
The proposal advanced in this Article has been sketchy and tentative. It marks only one possible path toward the correction of our
unworkable trial procedures. Nevertheless, judges, court administrators, rulemakers, and others should abandon their current emphasis
on hammered settlements and other shortcuts and renew our society's
commitment to the provision of basic adjudicative services.
In a more civilized society, the extensive' rationing of adjudication
by price and queue would not assure wrongdoers that they always
could "settle" and profit from their wrongs. In this society, a right
would be something that one gets, not merely something that one has.
People would know that they could take their disputes to the courts
and that the courts would resolve them. With this assurance, people
might be less likely to take their disputes to the streets or to the
subways.
204 See supra pp. 1819-20.
205 See supra p. iSxi & note 51.
206 See supra p. x829 & note 90. When these figures are placed on a graph, they form a

straight line. If projected into the future, the line suggests that the federal courts will conduct
no trials at all after the year 2000. Of course the line is likely to curve before it hits bottom.
Nevertheless, the descent seems to be continuing with great rapidity.
207 Adjudication does occur in rulings on motions for summary judgment, in other pretrial
rulings, and in "alternative dispute resolution" proceedings. Nevertheless, one should not alibi
Ringling Brothers' failure to perform in the big top by pointing to its diversions and sideshows.
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